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ABSTRACT 
The Republic of Macedonia (ROM) remained peaceful during the violent breakup 
of Yugoslavia. The 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis, however, combined with a large, 
disgruntled ethnic Albanian minority, triggered an ethnic conflict between the 
Macedonian security forces and Albanian rebels in February 2001. Hostilities ended with 
the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in August 2001. It proposed a power-
sharing system between the Macedonians and the minorities, along with greater cultural 
and educational rights. Since Ohrid, the republic has worked to implement the 
Framework Agreement and reform its institutions, all in hopes of joining the European 
Union. This thesis examines the factors that led to the 2001 conflict, the status of the 
Framework Agreement implementation, and the political, economic and security reforms 
the ROM promised to the EU. Factors supporting success in executing the reforms will 
be examined, as well as factors impeding progress. Finally, this thesis discusses what 
roles the international community plays in the development of the ROM. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. OVERVIEW.....................................................................................................1 
B. THESIS STRUCTURE ...................................................................................2 
II. CONFLICT PREVENTION AND STABILIZATION OF MULTI-ETHNIC 
SOCIETIES..................................................................................................................7 
A. WEAKNESS INVITES VIOLENCE .............................................................7 
B. PREVENTING INTERNAL CONFLICT...................................................10 
III HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ....................................................................................15 
A.  ANCIENT MACEDONIA AND THE CENTURIES LEADING 
TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE....................................................................15 
B. THE BIRTH OF THE STATE .....................................................................25 
1. The Albanian Minority: Their Marginalization within the 
ROM....................................................................................................29 
C. 2001 ETHNIC CONFLICT: THE BREAKING POINT ...........................32 
D. THE OHRID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT: THE CHALLENGE 
OF IMPLEMENTATION.............................................................................35 
IV. POST-OHRID TO PRESENT: IMPLEMENTING THE OHRID 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT AND REFORMING THE STATE...................41 
A.  THE EUROPEAN UNION: ITS ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS..........41 
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA................................................................................................44 
C. FOUR DESIRED END STATES: GOALS TOWARDS 
STRENGTHENING THE STATE...............................................................48 
1.  Stable Democracy...............................................................................48 
a. Decentralization ......................................................................48 
b. Equal Representation..............................................................54 
c. The Badinter Principle............................................................57 
2.  Rule of Law and Security ..................................................................59 
a. Police and Border Control......................................................59 
b. Judicial Reform.......................................................................62 
c.  Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) and NATO.......63 
3.  ECONOMIC PROSPERITY............................................................65 
4.  SOCIAL WELL-BEING...................................................................70 
D. PROSPECTIVE EU MEMBER STATES...................................................74 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................81 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................81 
1. Stable Democracy...............................................................................81 
a. Sharing Power.........................................................................82 
2. Secure Environment and Rule of Law.............................................82 
a. Police Forces ...........................................................................83 
 viii
b. Judiciary ..................................................................................83 
3. Sustainable Economy.........................................................................84 
a. Infrastructure ..........................................................................84 
b. The Workforce.........................................................................85 
4.  Social Well-Being ...............................................................................85 
a. Equal Education .....................................................................85 
B. CLOSING THOUGHTS ...............................................................................86 
APPENDIX A.........................................................................................................................89 
A. EAR ACTIVITIES ON DECENTRALIZATION 2000–2006 ...................89 
B. UNDP ACTIVITIES ON DECENTRALIZATION 2005–2009 ................90 
C. DECENTRALIZATION AID EFFORTS BY USAID, IREX, AND 
SADC...............................................................................................................91 
APPENDIX B .........................................................................................................................93 
A. EAR ACTIVITIES IN SECURITY REFORM 2001-2006 ........................93 
B. OSCE SPILLOVER MONITOR MISSION TO SKOPJE........................94 
APPENDIX C.........................................................................................................................95 
A. EAR ACTIVITIES TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
2001-2006 ........................................................................................................95 
B. WORLD BANK LOAN PROJECT FOR THE ROM................................96 
C. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND LOAN......................................96 
D. USAID ACTIVITIES TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1993-2007 ........................................................................................................97 
APPENDIX D.........................................................................................................................99 
A. USAID EDUCATION PROJECT................................................................99 
B. WORLD BANK EDUCATION LOAN .....................................................100 
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................101 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................107 
 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Rotberg’s Definition of Political Goods ............................................................8 
Table 2. Prevention of intrastate conflict .......................................................................12 
Table 3. Four Desired End States...................................................................................14 
Table 4. Highlights of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and government reforms......36 
Table 5. Matching the four desired end states with post Ohrid reforms........................39 
Table 6. CARDS Program Allocation for 2000-2006 (million €) .................................43 
Table 7. CARDS allocation 2002–2006 to the ROM (million €) ..................................44 
Table 8. Advantages and Disadvantages of Decentralization........................................49 
Table 9. Numbers of laws passed, as of end of 2006.....................................................53 
Table 10. Employment percentage per population compared to national census............55 
Table 11. ROM employment indicators...........................................................................67 
Table 12. ROM economic indicators ...............................................................................67 
Table 13. Recent economic indicators .............................................................................70 
Table 14. Education in the ROM .....................................................................................73 
Table 15. Failed State Index ............................................................................................77 
Table 16. Economic Indicators 2007 ...............................................................................77 
Table 17. Foreign Direct Investment Inflow 2007...........................................................78 
 
 x





Although the breakup of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s caused a flood 
of ethnic violence throughout the Balkans, the Republic of Macedonia (ROM)1 remained 
immune to the problems faced by its neighbors. The international community praised its 
ability to remain a peaceful multi-ethnic state. This changed in the winter of 2001, 
however, when Albanian rebels, who called themselves the National Liberation Army 
(NLA), began attacks on government buildings and security forces. The NLA claimed the 
violence was a result of the government’s poor treatment of the ethnic Albanian minority 
in the Republic of Macedonia (ROM).  The government, meanwhile, considered the NLA 
to be radical Albanian separatist who wanted to create a greater Albania. 
The battle ensued for six months until the United Nations forced both sides into 
ceasefire negotiations. The UN feared that continued violence would further destabilize 
southeast Europe. Both Macedonian and Albanian political elites, along with 
international mediators, began peace negotiation talks. The end result was the signing of 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) on August 13, 2001. The agreement called for 
an end to the violence and provided concessions towards Albanian grievances. 
Concessions included the adoption of a power-sharing system with its minorities; the 
equitable representation and non-discrimination of minorities in employment in the civil 
and public service sector; education rights such as state funding for minority-attended 
universities; and positive discrimination, allowing better opportunities for minorities in 
university enrollment. Included was a revised law on local self-government providing 
minorities greater autonomy in communities where they are in the majority.  
                                                 
1 What’s in a name? "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) is used in relations 
involving states that do not recognize the constitutional name, "Republic of Macedonia." The U.S. 
recognizes the country’s constitution name of “Republic of Macedonia,” (ROM) while Greece claims the 
name “Macedonia.” The ongoing dispute has generated a great deal of political and academic debate on 
both sides.  Nevertheless, all UN member-states, and the UN as a whole, have agreed to accept any final 
agreement on the name resulting from negotiations between the two countries, yet to be resolved at the time 
of this research. 
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Since the ROM received independence in 1991, the ethnic Albanians complained 
of being marginalized by the ethnic Macedonian majority. They claimed to have limited 
access in higher education, which impeded their chances of obtaining professional jobs 
and earning a living. They claimed that their cultural rights were limited — such as the 
hanging of the Albanian flag and icons over buildings and town squares. Lastly, ethnic 
Albanians demanded greater language rights, which meant recognizing Albanian as an 
official language.    
In the Republic of Macedonia, according to the country’s 2002 public census, 
Albanians make up 25% of the population, while other ethnic groups, such as the Roma, 
Serbs, Turks, and Vlachs, make up 10%.  Ethnic Albanians typically live in the rural, 
western portion of the country, mainly working in agriculture. Minorities were allowed to 
form their own political parties within the country’s parliament, but ethnic Albanians 
claimed that the Albanian political leaders did little to improve their status. In 2001, the 
NLA would gain more in the six-month conflict than the Albanian politicians could in the 
prior ten years. This brought fears that a militant Albanian group would be needed to 
provide results.  
This thesis examines the following questions: 
• What factors spurred the ethnic conflict? 
• What is the status of implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement? 
• What factors promote success and impede progress in the reform of the 
state? 
• What is the past, present and future role of the international community in 
developing the ROM? 
• What are the prospects of the ROM gaining EU membership? 
B. THESIS STRUCTURE  
This thesis begins with a discussion on the theoretical framework for conflict 
prevention and the stabilization of multi-ethnic societies. Since the ROM is a young state, 
it may have institutional weaknesses that could lead to poor accommodation of its 
minorities. Chapter II argues that the weakness of the state leads to a poor ability to 
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provide security and economic stability to its citizens. This may lead to further 
marginalization of minorities, which could lead to rebellion. Other factors that may force 
minorities to rebel against the state are also discussed. The goal of the chapter is to create 
a stability checklist to evaluate the situation, and to critique the state’s performance 
towards implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and its reforms.  
Chapter III starts with a timeline of historical events within the region. The 
chapter goes back to ancient Macedonia and its relationship with its Greek neighbors. It 
discusses the various empires that ruled Macedonia, each of which brought forces that 
shaped Macedonians today. The timeline then explores past the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, the nations of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia would fight for the territorial remains 
of Macedonia. Lastly, how Macedonia would become a republic within Tito’s 
Yugoslavia federation will be discussed. 
Macedonia became independent in 1991, following the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
What were the difficulties in developing its state? Tito’s Yugoslavia remained relatively 
peaceful with its minorities, but the new state would face challenges, especially from the 
ethnic Albanians who wanted greater autonomy.  
Chapter III also explores the factors that spurred the ethnic conflict with the 
Albanian rebels. Was the conflict strictly over rights? Did other concerns motivate the 
NLA? If the Macedonians really had marginalized the Albanians, what caused them to do 
so? The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
(OFA), which ended the conflict. Its pros and cons are examined in an effort to 
understand the challenges of the OFA implementation. The chapter includes discussion 
on why the Albanians were seen as the winners — and the Macedonians as the losers.    
Chapter IV updates events since the signing of the OFA and evaluates what role 
the international community played in the ROM. In 1999, following the events in 
Kosovo, the EU focused its attention on providing long-term stability within the Balkans. 
That year the EU created the Stability Pact to assist in developing the countries of 
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southeastern Europe.2 Along with the Stability Pact, the EU created the Stabilization and 
Association Process, which is the first step towards integration into the EU. This process 
allowed the ROM to work closely with the EU on its reforms.  The chapter outlines what 
contributions are being provided by the EU, international governmental organizations 
(IGO’s), and non-government organizations (NGOs) in developing the ROM. The status 
of the implementation of the OFA will be discussed, exploring which factors are 
promoting success in the state’s reforms and which factors impede progress.  
Chapter IV concludes with a comparison of how the ROM compares to other 
southeast European countries. Countries like the ROM are executing reforms in hopes of 
EU membership. Indicators such as growth, inflation, unemployment, and corruption are 
analyzed. The capacity of the EU in admitting new states is discussed, focusing on how it 
could impede the republic’s motivations for reform.  
Chapter V evaluates the OFA and makes policy recommendations. The stability 
checklist created in Chapter II is used to judge the republic’s reform efforts. It 
summarizes what has been done, where the country stands politically, economically and 
socially, and what the future holds.   
The OFA’s main goal was to secure the future of Macedonian democracy, and 
develop closer and more integrated relations between the country and the Euro-Atlantic 
community.3 This raises the question of what classifies as success in the case of the 
ROM?  Does the containment of major ethnic violence alone signify success? Or, is it the 
full implementation of the OFA?  It is the author’s opinion that ultimate success will be 
membership into the EU, where the OFA is used as a roadmap towards the strengthening 
of the state. Containing major ethnic violence is a good thing, but it would maintain only 
a fragile status quo where a minor event could retrigger ethnic violence. Non-
implementation of the OFA would demonstrate the lack of the government’s political will 
                                                 
2 “Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, from a conflict prevention and confidence building 
initiative in South Eastern Europe to a regionally-owned Regional Co-operation Council,” 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/SPownershipprocessPortal.asp, accessed August 1, 2008.  
3  Ohrid Framework Agreement, August 8, 2001, 
http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf, accessed January 15, 2008.  
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and its division along ideological and ethnic lines. This is why it is essential for the EU to 
provide guidance and expertise to boost reforms and consolidate gains.  
Overall, success requires strong institutions, as well as a common marketplace 
where citizens have rights to higher education, opportunities to build private businesses, 
and the ability to compete for professional jobs under the protection of the state. The EU 
would be the best avenue for prosperity. In 2005, the republic was elected to become a 
candidate country towards EU membership. The OFA’s implementation is essential to 
meet the EU’s acceptance criteria. Its full implementation ensures political reform, 
respect of minority rights, a revised plan for decentralization, and development of a 
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II. CONFLICT PREVENTION AND STABILIZATION OF 
MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES 
Conflict, including ethnic conflict, is not unavoidable but can indeed be 
prevented. This requires, however, that necessary efforts be made. 
Potential sources of conflict need to be identified and analyzed with a 
view to their early resolution, and concrete steps must be taken to forestall 
armed confrontation.  
—Max van der Stoel, OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities, 20054 
When the Republic of Macedonia gained independence from the Republic of 
Yugoslavia in 1991, the future offered a transition from an autocratic regime authority to 
a democracy and from communism to a free market. Since the ROM was a new 
democracy, the democratic structures themselves were new, and the capacity to 
effectively govern would be limited.  This chapter examines the weaknesses that led to 
ethnic violence and interstate conflict, the inability of weak democracies to prevent 
conflict, factors triggering ethnic groups to rebel against the state, and conflict prevention 
mechanisms that experts say are necessary to maintain peace.  
A. WEAKNESS INVITES VIOLENCE 
Robert I. Rotberg categorizes nation-states under three categories: strong, weak or 
failing, depending on the state’s ability or inability to provide qualities or quantities of 
political goods.5 Political goods refer to the strength of the state’s institutions, protections 
of human rights, rule of law, and ability to provide economic prosperity. In a strong state, 
ethnic minorities feel secure and protected under these structures. In a weak state, those 
structures become unreliable. The state’s capacity to provide political goods is limited, 
which may lead the state to provide its services to a certain portion of the population, 
whether they are the elite, or preferred ethnic or religious group. The remaining groups 
                                                 
4 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Second 
Edition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 106.    
5 Robert I. Rotberg, Leashing the Dogs of War, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela 
Aall, eds. (U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 2007), 83. 
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become marginalized from the state’s political and social spectrum. Rothberg’s definition 
of providing political goods is broken down into five categories as listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1.   Rotberg’s Definition of Political Goods6 
 
Security: The primary role of the state is to provide security. Without security, there could be no stability 
or economic growth. The state must secure its territory and borders, reduce internal threats and provide 
human security by preventing crime. It must project power from the capitol city to the provinces. Human 
agency is the cause of failing states. It allows corruption, escalating inflation, harassment of civil society, 
electoral fraud, disenfranchisement of ethnic groups, threats to judicial independence, and weakening of 
state police forces. Lack of security threatens commerce and business structures. 
 
 
Governance and Rule of Law: Requires a transparent and predictable system of handling disputes and 
regulating the laws of the society. Laws are enforced by procedures and oversight.  Effective rule of law 
requires an effective judicial system, security of property and the enforceability of contracts. Without a 
formalized body of laws that validate the values of the citizens, societal bonds weaken and disputes are 
handled violently.  
  
 
Participation in the democratic process: Right to participate and compete for political office, and support 
for state’s political institutions and courts, a media that’s free from government control and overall respect 
for human and civil rights are hallmarks of participation in a democratic society. Failing states typically 
control or limit the citizen’s rights towards information or free speech. Such states fear that an informed 
citizenry would marginalize their power to control. 
 
 
Economic growth and prosperity: A banking system supported by a national currency is essential. It 
provides the ability for citizens to pursue entrepreneurial ideas with the potential to prosper. State 
investment into infrastructure that provides jobs and builds a sense of community pride contribute to 
stability. When states direct the available resources to the elite, they typically slip deeper towards failure. 
High corruption typically means failure. Money taken overseas means it wasn’t invested into the country.  
 
 
Other political goods:  
     - Education: Skilled teachers who are paid, opportunity to receive higher education, provides school 
supplies, and the reduction of illiteracy all contribute to national stability. States that do not support the 
schools leave them vulnerable to insurrection. 
     - Infrastructure: The more potholes you see within the state’s roads, the more the government is failing. 
State must provide capitol for crew, equipment, and materials. The fewer railroads and roads, the less 
communities are connected. 
     - Medical Treatment: Society must provide resources such as training, equipment and medicine to 
reduce infant mortality, diseases, low life expectancy.  
 
                                                 
6 Rotberg, Leashing the Dogs of War, 83-87.  
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The weaker the state becomes in providing political goods, the greater the chance 
intrastate violence can occur. Jack S. Levy writes, “The collapse of a state power leaves 
ethno-national groups in a condition resembling international anarchy, without any 
guarantees that their security and rights will be protected.”7 If the failure of a state can lead 
into civil war, it can also occur when its citizens question state legitimacy of power. Michael 
W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that civil wars arise when individuals, groups, and 
factions discover that a policeman, judge, soldier, or politician no longer speaks and acts for 
them. Rather than “the local cop on the beat,” the cop becomes “the Croatian, Serb or 
Muslim cop.”8 
Is the state always to blame for ethnic conflict? Minorities may have conflicting 
views on politics, religion, and economic policies with their government. Opportunities may 
arise, which can warrant action from these groups. Three factors can trigger a communal 
group’s willingness to rebel: collective incentives, capacity for joint action and external 
opportunities.9 Ethnic rebellion tends to occur in areas where that ethnic group is the 
majority. Any failure of the central government to govern these areas can lead to requests for 
greater autonomy or to secessionist attempts by the ethnic group in the small region where it 
dominates. 
Failures of the state can be exaggerated by ethnic leaders looking to trigger violence 
for personal reasons. Levy writes, “These security-driven insecurities can be exacerbated 
when the leaders of one group attempt to unify their own people, and to enhance their own 
standing among them, by rhetorically exaggerating the potential threat posed by the other, 
acting to rectify past injustices (real or imagined), and generally using other ethnic groups as 
scapegoats for domestic problems.”10 He cites Slobodan Milosevic as a leader who used his 
own ethnic group to mobilize support during the Yugoslavian wars. 
                                                 
7 Jack Levy, Leashing the Dogs of War, 27.  
8 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War & Building Peace (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 28. 
9 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Second 
Edition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 113.     
10 Levy, Leashing the Dogs of War, 27-28. 
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B. PREVENTING INTERNAL CONFLICT 
If weak states fail to provide security, rule of law, and economic prosperity to its 
citizens, the greater the chances it may find itself in a conflict. Edward Azar theorized 
that armed conflict will degrade governance, deform institutions and impede 
development. In this case, if good governance is applied, the probability of conflict 
should be reduced. 
This leads to the goal of Chapter II. What steps are needed to avoid ethnic 
conflict? Ted Gurr writes of six essential principles in managing communal conflict.11  
1. Promote: recognize and promote group political, cultural, and 
educational rights. Allow for the prevention of discrimination 
based on religion, race, place of origin and language. Institutions 
such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) have set the standards for European countries with 
minorities. They monitor and prohibit forced assimilation, promote 
autonomy in ethnically dominant areas within states, and present 
minority issues to the UN. 
2. Recognize: allow the right of regional minorities to sub state 
autonomy. Establish some form of federalist system that provides 
rights to local self government. This concept is difficult in 
centralized states due to fears of secessionists movements in 
ethnically dominated areas.  
3. Democratize: democratic institutions and power sharing are 
preferred means for protecting group rights. If minority rights are 
recognized, all groups collectively can pursue their interests. 
Power sharing allows minorities a forum to voice their concerns 
and provide oversight that helps ensure their civil and political 
rights.  
4. Accommodation: mutual accommodation is the preferred strategy 
for managing civil conflicts. It is better to negotiate than face an 
endless insurgency. Opposing factions typically ask for 
independence, but eventually see they are overpowered. They will 
eventually see the cost of accommodation is less than a prolonged 
war.   
5. Engage: international engagement to promote negotiated 
settlements of communal conflict. The need is great for powerful 
third parties such as the EU, United Nations, and the OSCE to 
                                                 
11 Gurr, Leashing the Dogs of War, 151-155. 
 11
promote engagement. Such third parties can use leverage to force a 
peace.   The EU can entice countries into EU membership; the UN 
can threaten sanctions; the U.S. can ban them as a trade partner.  
6. Intervention: Coercive intervention is a necessary response to 
gross violations of human rights. Peace enforcement missions are 
sometimes necessary and justifiable. Interventions are needed to 
prevent spillover effects which threaten regional security.  
Overall, Gurr’s concept in managing ethnic conflict focuses on the concept of 
power-sharing, cultural, educational and human rights, granting local autonomy to 
minority communities and third-party interventions. Lastly, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom 
Woodhouse and Hugh Miall include factors generating conflict and possible preventers in 
Table 2. They provide conflict prevention mechanisms at the state and societal level. 
They argue that there needs to be not just essential reform at the state level but deep or 
structural prevention techniques that address root causes of conflict to prevent their 











Table 2.   Prevention of intrastate conflict 
Factors generating conflict Possible preventers 
State Level  
Ethnic Stratification Power-sharing/federalism/autonomy 
Weak economies Appropriate Development 
Authoritarian rule Legitimacy, democratization 
Human right abuse Rule of Law, human rights monitoring 
Societal Level  
Weak societies Strengthening civic society, institutions 
Weak communications Round tables, workshops, community relations 
Polarized attitudes Cross-cultural work 
Poverty, inequality Poverty reduction and social reforms 
Exclusion policies Stronger moderates 
 Source: Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 121. 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall also stress the importance of global and 
regional factors. On the global level, inappropriate systemic structures can cause internal 
conflict and can be prevented by changes within international order. On the regional 
level, ethnic Diasporas regionally can cause complications in neighboring states, which 
can be managed by regional security arrangements.   
This chapter stressed that avoiding conflict depends on the strengthening of 
democracies, including institutional reforms, economic reform, regional and local 
security, respecting human rights, and the inclusion of ethnic groups into civil society. 
Now it is possible to develop a stability checklist to use as a tool in evaluating the case of 
the ROM. Since it is considered a new democracy, based on Rothberg’s theory, the 
country may have provided weak political goods via its inability to provide economic 
prosperity and security to its citizens. This could have contributed to the ethnic Albanian 
minority willingness to rebel, according to Gurr’s theory. Also, Table 2 presented factors 
that certainly may have generated ethnic conflict in the ROM.   
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The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the OFA’s implementation in settling ethnic 
grievances and reforms that would strengthen the state. The hope is for the ROM to shift 
from a weak state to a strong state. In consolidating the information of this chapter in 
Table 3, a stability checklist is provided that highlight what is essential in reforming 
ethnically mixed societies recovering from conflict. The checklist is broken down into 
four desired end states:  
a. stable democracy,  
b. secure environment and rule of law,  
c. sustainable economy, and  
d. social well-being.  
Chapter IV analyzes the reforms executed by the ROM government. The final 
chapter of this thesis examine whether the ROM is approaching those desired end states. 
The objective is to analyze the implementation of reforms against what was stated as 
being important in developing weak democracies and the accommodation of ethnic 










Table 3.   Four Desired End States12 
1. Stable Democracy 
A. Build legitimate institutions at the state, regional, and local level. Ministries and civil service sector 
must be reliable, efficient and maintain integrity 
  
B. Allow the concept of power sharing in a multi ethnic state. This includes equal representation of 
minorities within the state and local level, and decentralization to allow greater autonomy of ethnic groups. 
 
C. Provide mechanism that would provide oversight to prevent corruptions within the state’s political and 
civil body.  
2. Secure environment and Rule of Law 
A. Security forces which protect international borders, key infrastructure, and airspace. 
 
B. Police forces that are transparent, accountable, protect human rights, build civilian confidence and 
represent the ethnic makeup of the land. 
 
C. Build a legitimate and accountable judicial system that supports the states constitution, laws, and 
properties. It also must be open to all ethnic groups and its application treating all equal. It must ensures 
judges are selected based on merit and not political favoritism 
4. Social Well-Being 
A. Recognize and promote group political, cultural, and educational rights. Allow minority groups the 
opportunity to express their identity in a method accepted by the state.  
 
B. Provide equal education to all ethnic groups such as opportunities for advanced education which helps 
assimilation into the workforce.   
 
C. Promote a peaceful existence between ethnic groups by workshops for breaking barriers. 
Source: Checklist adopted from the Guide for Participation in Peace, Stabilty, and Relief Operations, also 
in consolidating the information of this chapter (see footnote 12).  
 
 
                                                 
12 Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson created a framework of what they considered essential for 
rebuilding societies emerging from conflict. Table 3 consolidates the theories of this chapter, along with the 
Serwer and Thomson framework, to focus primarily on weak democracies that cater to large minorities 
such as in the case of the ROM.    
3. Sustainable Economy 
A: Build effective and reliable financial and economic institutions, promote private business and 
entrepreneurship and attract foreign investment by accommodating international business 
 
B: Reconstruct and invest the states infrastructure such as transportation and communication. 
 
C. Creates policies that would fight unemployment and train a viable workforce 
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III HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A.  ANCIENT MACEDONIA AND THE CENTURIES LEADING TOWARDS 
INDEPENDENCE 
When we speak of the territory of ancient Macedonia, it is normally referred to as 
geographic Macedonia. This occupies present-day ROM, northern Greece, and a small 
western portion of Bulgaria. Geographic Macedonia was also called Upper Macedonia, 
which is the mountainous area, and Lower Macedonia, which is the costal area. In the 
beginning of 2200 BC, the occupants of this region formed into tribes each ruled by a 
King. Towards the south into mainland Greece, the Mycenaeans began to spread their 
culture in 1400-1200 BC. As centuries passed, a separation of culture developed between 
Upper Macedonia and Lower Macedonia. The tribes of Lower Macedonia, with their 
close proximity to Greece, became Greek-influenced. Upper Macedonia shared land with 
Illyrian, Peaonian and Thracian tribes. Around the seventh century, one of the tribes 
increased its sphere of influence into the costal planes of Lower Macedonia, and formed 
the Kingdom of Macedonia. 
These kings had good relations with their southern neighbors, the Greeks. The 
Macedon kings of Lower Macedonia considered themselves of Greek descent — and 
often worshipped Greek gods — while the kings to the north claimed to be descendents 
from the Bacchidate. Despite great similarity between the Macedonians and the Greeks, 
there were distinct differences.  Hammond cites these differences in conclusions written 
by Thucydides, Isocrates, and other Classical sources.  
The men of the royal house certainly spoke Greek. They also spoke the 
language of their people, ‘Macedonian,’ which contained words of early 
Greek origin but was not intelligible to contemporary Greeks. The 
Macedonians in general did not consider themselves Greeks, nor were 
they considered Greeks by their neighbors.13 
                                                 
13 Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2000), 13.        
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When King Perdiccas of Macedonia died in 359 BC, the kingdom was at risk of 
collapse until King Phillip stepped onto the scene. He consolidated both Upper and 
Lower Macedonia into one strong entity. Greece was weakened by the Peloponnesian 
wars between Athens and Sparta. Macedonia, once the outcast of regional affairs now 
dominated it.  
In Greece, there were conflicting schools of thought about Macedonian influence. 
Demosthenes (384-322 BC) never accepted Macedonians as Greeks and loathed King 
Phillip.14 He saw the Macedonians as barbaric and lacking culture. Isocrates remained a 
supporter of Phillip and saw the need to maintain good relations to protect Greece against 
foreign threats. Philip imposed peace and an alliance with the Greeks. He later formed a 
Hellenic Alliance based in Corinth.15 Power eventually passed down to his son 
Alexander, who further expanded Greek culture into his military conquest, which 
stretched as far as India.  
Alexander was seen as the force that united the quarreling Greek states, led the 
Greek armies, and spread Greek civilization throughout the known world. This is 
recognized as the great connection between Alexander and the Greeks today. He came to 
personify Macedonian Hellenism at its best.16 After Alexander’s death, his empire was 
split into three parts: Macedon/Greece, Syria and Egypt. These three parts were 
controlled by his generals. As time passed, the empire weakened and gave rise to a new 
power, the Romans. Rome’s rapid influence into Eastern Mediterranean areas brought a 
zone between Latin and Greek speaking cultures. The Romans ruled under their 
administration with a sub culture that included Greeks, Macedonians, Vlachos, Thracians, 
and Illyrians. In 324 AD, the Roman Empire’s capital was shifted to the east. It was 
called Constantinople, after the Emperor Constantine. This was the beginning of the 
Byzantine Empire.  
                                                 
14 Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? 14.      
15 Robin Lane Fox, An Epic History of Greece and Rome (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 197. 
16 Loring M. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 38.  
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In the sixth century, a number of Indo-European tribes traveled from east-central 
Europe and called themselves Slavs. In the seventh century, the Proto-Bulgarians also 
arrived. By the ninth century, both groups, speaking a common Slav language, were 
converted to Christianity with the help of two religious brothers from Salonika, the Saints 
Constantine and Methodius. The Slavs were able to maintain their religion, language and 
culture. This helped them prevent assimilation with the Greeks despite their shared 
geography.   
The Bulgarians fought for land and power in the eastern Balkans with the 
Byzantines. In the ninth and tenth centuries, military campaigns by Tsar Boris and 
Simeon the Great led to the Bulgarian Empire whose territory extended into Upper 
Macedonia and parts of Lower Macedonia. In the latter part of the tenth century, Tsar 
Samuel, who based his empire in Macedonia near the Ohrid and Prespa lakes, eventually 
would have his empire weakened by the constant Byzantine military offensives.   
The Bulgarians would continue to battle the Byzantines throughout the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries for rule of Macedonian territory until another Slavic group 
gained power. The Serbs rapidly gained influence in what is the area that is present-day 
Kosovo. In 1282, King Milutin, the Serbian King, took Skopje (present-day capitol of the 
ROM) from the Byzantines. Later, Tsar Stephan Dusan would expand Serbian influence 
deep into Macedonia, which would be the start of the Serbian Empire. However, this 
would be short-lived. After Dusan’s death, the empire disintegrated. This presented an 
opportune time for a new power to spread its influence. The Ottoman’s conquest of the 
Balkans led to victory in 1389 in Kosovo. This gave the Ottomans complete power in the 
Balkans and allowed them to set sights on Constantinople. The Byzantine capitol resisted 
Ottoman raids until its port was sacked in 1453. The combination of crusades from 
Western Europe and disunity within the Balkans weakened the empire to leading its 
eventual collapse.  
Since the Ottoman Empire was Islamic, it divided the multi-religious groups into 
what it called a millet system. Muslims were recognized as first class citizens within the 
system. To take advantage of first class status, mass conversions to Islam were conducted 
for Albanians and Slavs into Muslims. Christians were organized into separate millets, 
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along with other religious groups such as the Jews. The Ottomans were not interested in 
assimilating the religious groups; this could have been due to its lack of institutional capacity 
to merge the groups and the difficulty of communication due to mountainous terrain.  
The people within the Christian Orthodox millets in the Balkans were under the 
control of the Greek patriarchate in Istanbul (formerly Constantinople). The Bulgarians and 
Serbs both feared assimilation into Greek influence under that religious structure. Both 
groups throughout the centuries struggled to maintain autonomy for control over maintaining 
a Serbian or Bulgarian church. This struggle continued into the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-
78. Russia sided with the Bulgarian struggle for a church and self-determination. Russia also 
looked towards Bulgaria to expand its influence into the Balkans. Following the Turkish 
defeat, the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878 granted Bulgaria most of geographic Macedonia. 
The Bulgarian parishes called it Greater Bulgaria, where their dreams of their own state 
finally came true. Nevertheless, the great powers of Britain and Austria-Hungary, fearing 
Russian influence, sent warships to Dardanelles and war became a great possibility.17 Russia 
backed down and eventually the Treaty of San Stefano was voided through the Treaty of 
Berlin. Therefore, Bulgaria lost its hopes of unifying the Slavic people of Macedonia with the 
Bulgarians. 
The Treaty of Berlin amplified the national consciousness of the Slavs living in 
Macedonia. Many forces were coming down upon the Slavs in the area. The Bulgarians 
continued to have ambitions of assimilation and unification of the land, as did the Serbs with 
the western portion of the land and the Greeks with Lower Macedonia. The Slavo 
Macedonians living in Bulgaria formed special interest groups, which had specific plans for 
Macedonia. One such group called the ‘Supreme Committee’ hoped for annexation into 
Bulgaria. Another more radical group quickly emerged called the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization (IMRO).18 This group formally collaborated with the Supreme 
Committee but a more radical element with the organization developed demanding a separate 
Macedonian state.  
                                                 
17 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2000), 143. 
18 The IMRO was the first organized revolutionary group to challenge occupational authority in 
Macedonia. They saw Macedonia territory as their own and all inhabitants as Macedonians, no matter their 
religion or ethnicity." The IMRO are considered the founders of the Macedonian national conscience.    
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After the Berlin Treaty, the Ottoman Empire remained intact but weakened. Greece 
declared independence in 1821 and managed to regain territory up to Thessaly. Serbia and 
Bulgaria were independent and looking for expansion into Macedonia. In August 1903, an 
uprising occurred in Macedonia. The Ilinden uprising (St. Elijah’s Day) was a VMRO 
(formerly IMRO) led a campaign against the Ottomans. It resulted in the crushing of rebels 
by the Ottoman Army. The revolt was viewed mainly as a symbolic statement against the 
Turks and received credit for creating international interest in Macedonia.  
The Albanians, who were typically loyal to their Turkish rulers, feared that Serbian 
and Greek territorial gains would eventually cause loss of their own lands. They felt that the 
Ottoman Empire was too weak to protect them so they mobilized guerrilla movements 
against such threats. The end result was an independent Albanian state in 1912. By this time, 
the only stronghold in the Balkans for the Ottomans was in Macedonia.  
Within the Ottoman Empire, a new group emerged hoping to preserve what was left 
of the empire. The Young Turks were made up of a core of junior officers within the Army. 
They opposed Abdulhamid’s autocratic rule and gained influence from western nationalist 
ideology. They formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and eventually 
overthrew the Sultan, founding the Republic of Turkey.  
With great changes occurring throughout the Balkans during the early twentieth 
century, there would be competition towards claiming the decaying portions of the Ottoman 
Empire. In 1912, the countries of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, forged an alliance against the 
Turks. Differences between the small states were forgiven. They were to unite militarily 
against the stronger power. Bulgaria and Serbia, who initially agreed to an autonomous 
Macedonia, secretly agreed for a division of influence in northern Macedonia. Greece and 
Serbia made no such territorial agreements but the stage was set for the first Balkan War. 
The allies were victorious and the Treaty of London of 1913 left the Ottomans with 
nothing but Istanbul within the Balkans.  
The allies were at odds about how Macedonia should be split. Bulgaria seemed 
the most disgruntled by the arrangement since they had assumed the burden of the 
fighting against the Turks. The Serbs wanted more territory since Austria-Hungary and 
Italy pressured Serbia to give up more land to the Albanians. The port city of Salonika 
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was contested by the Bulgarians and Greeks. This forced a Greek Serbian alliance against 
Bulgaria. The Bulgarians attacked the Greek and Serbian lines, which marked the 
beginning of the Second Balkan War. The Ottomans and the Romanians also attacked the 
Bulgarians. This left Bulgaria powerless and quickly defeated. Now geographic 
Macedonia was to be partitioned into three parts and renamed by the three countries. 
Vardar Macedonia would go to Serbia, Aegean Macedonia would now be northern 
Greece, and Pirin Macedonia became the southwest portion of Bulgaria. Through the 
Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, Bulgaria would retain only a small portion of what it had 
won in the first Balkan War.  
 During the First World War, Greece and Serbia joined the Entente Powers, while 
Bulgaria sided with the Central Powers in hopes of regaining territory lost after the 
Second Balkan War. During the war, the Bulgarian Army occupied most of Western and 
Aegean Macedonia. The Bulgarians took the opportunity to assimilate the Slavs while the 
occupation of Aegean Macedonia was considered harsh with reports of famine 
throughout the villages. Overall, the poor management of the occupation in Macedonia 
by the Bulgarians damaged their credibility with Slavs who once favored them. When the 
Central Powers were defeated in 1918, Bulgaria was again forced to retreat from its gains 
in Macedonia. Vardar Macedonia would become a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes. A Macedonians delegation made its way to Versailles to state its case for 
autonomy, but it was not granted a hearing.19     
Before and after the war years, there was a dramatic shift in the ethnic makeup of 
the Balkans. The Greek-Bulgarian convention of 1919 resulted in an exchange population 
of 25,000 Greeks, and between 52,000 to 72,000 Bulgarians were allowed to resettle to 
their motherlands.20 The largest ethnic exchanged took place between the Greeks and 
Turks. Less than 400,000 Turks were exchanged for more then one million Greeks. Most 
Greeks moved into Greek Macedonia.  
                                                 
19Keith Brown, The Past in Question: Modern Macedonians and the Uncertainties of Nation 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 41. 
20 Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? 86. 
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During the 1920s and 1930s, within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
the Slav Macedonians and the Albanians were constantly being faced with Serbian 
assimilation attempts. The VMRO, still an active group promoting a separate 
Macedonian state, joined forces with the Albanians to advance its hopes of the liberation 
of Macedonia to its geographic frontiers. The group mounted a number of attacks against 
Serbs in Macedonian territories. The group however, never really threatened state rule. 
They lacked public support and good Serbian and Bulgarian relations further affected 
their cause. Within the Kingdom of the Serbs, the voice of the Macedonians was being 
heard, not for a Macedonian separatist movement, but for some autonomy within 
Yugoslavian borders. This voice would be heard by the kingdom’s future leader, Tito. 
During pre-second World War, Bulgaria once again saw an opportunity to regain 
Macedonian territory. It aligned itself with Hitler under the axis powers. The Nazi 
occupation of the Balkans would be incorporated with the Bulgarian Army. Once again, 
the Bulgarians were occupiers of Macedonia. Initially, they were seen as liberators by 
Macedonians who disagreed with Serbian policies. The Bulgarians established a strong 
foothold within Skopje. As time passed, resentment grew against the occupation as 
religious and education practices emphasized pro-Bulgarian views. Treatment of the 
locals was considered poor while corruption further alienated the people. In 1942, a 
young communist leader in Yugoslavia saw this as an opportunity to build support 
against the occupation.  
Josip Broz Tito led a rebellion against the Nazis. During post-war Yugoslavia, 
Tito transitioned Yugoslavia into six federal states with the sixth being the Socialist 
Republic of Macedonia (SR Macedonia). Tito granted the Macedonians autonomy under 
his federal system in the hopes of keeping separatist movements at bay and eliminating 
Bulgarian influence. Tito, by most accounts, had even more ambitious plans. In a 




People of Macedonia! 
In the course of three years of combat you have achieved your unity, 
developed your army and laid the basis for the federal Macedonian state. 
With the participation of the entire Macedonian nation in the struggle 
against the Fascist occupiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece you will 
achieve unification of all parts of Macedonia, divided in 1915 and 1918 by 
Balkan imperialist.21  
Thus, this is what some called the invention of a national identity for the 
Macedonians.22 Tito’s Yugoslavia would unite with Stalin for a communist take-over of 
the Balkans. Tito’s ambitions were to include Bulgaria, possibly Albania and Greece to 
join his states. Stalin eventually became suspicious of Tito’s ambitions and motives, and 
Stalin had also promised Churchill to leave Greece alone. This led to the Stalin-Tito split 
where Russia would no longer support Tito’s expansion. The Greek Civil War (1945-50) 
was fought between the Greek nationalist government and Greek communists who 
considered union with Yugoslavia. Many Slav Macedonians living in Greece joined with 
the communist in hopes of forming a greater Macedonian Republic.23 The Greek 
government with British and US support defeated the communist and their hopes for 
expansion. The defeated Slavs of Greece were forced to find refuge in Yugoslavia or 
Bulgaria in fear of Greek persecution.  
During the Cold War, the Macedonians finally had a state, granted under Tito’s 
rule. Greece was too weak to argue its case against the Macedonian identity. The Western 
powers were more concerned about communist containment than solving ethnic 
questions. The countries in the Balkans were living in relative peace. In the early years of 
                                                 
21 Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? 106.        
22 The debate over the origins of Macedonians continues today. Extreme Macedonian nationalist claim 
they are direct descendents to the ancient Macedonians, most moderates and the general public agree that 
they have no relation to the ancient Macedonians since their ancestors arrived in the sixth century. Most 
Macedonians agree that ancient Macedonians were a distinct non-Greek people. The Greek nationalist 
position is that because Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians were Greeks, and because 
ancient and modern Greece have an unbroken line of racial and cultural continuity, only Greeks have the 
right to identify themselves as Macedonians. Moderate Greeks generally believe that Tito stole Macedonian 
history to consolidate his control over the Slav Macedonians.  
23 A Slav-speaking minority currently living in Greece are known as the Slavophones. Their exact 
number is unknown, and the Greek government does not officially label them as a minority. The ROM 
position is that the group is a Macedonian minority living in Greece and requesting the government to 
recognize them as such.     
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Tito’s Yugoslavia, Belgrade maintained centralized control of the six republics. 
Throughout the 1960s, reforms allowed for more decentralized control of the republics. 
As years passed, Belgrade struggled to maintain centralized control while Croatia and 
Slovenia demanded greater autonomy.  
One group that requested greater autonomy was the ethnic Albanians. They 
inhabited the autonomous region of Kosovo and the western portion of Macedonia. In 
November 1968, they demonstrated for a seventh republic uniting the Albanian 
population which Yugoslavian heads of state saw as an attempt to secede from 
Yugoslavia in hopes for a greater Albania. Also, SR Macedonia saw this as a threat to 
their republic. Any lost territory might result in Bulgaria reaffirming claims to 
Macedonia. To suppress Albanian nationalism, SR Macedonia conducted a campaign to 
eliminate the Albanian threat. They revamped their school curriculums to be strictly pro-
Macedonian and monitored Albanians for any activities that promoted nationalistic 
tendencies. This campaign was called ‘differentiation’ and led to dismissals of many 
Albanians from state administration and the disbandment of cultural clubs.24 The greatest 
grievance for the Albanian population in SR Macedonia was loss of educational and 
language rights. The Macedonian language was enforced as the official language in an 
area where Albanians were the majority. 
Despite the federation’s problems with minorities, it held together. It was first 
united in battles against Nazi occupation and under the threat of Soviet of aggression.25 
The death of Tito in 1980 marked the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia. In 1989, a 
young politician named Slobodan Milosevic was sent from Belgrade to Kosovo to settle a 
dispute with the disgruntled ethnic Albanians. The Albanians were protesting for greater 
autonomy and rights. Some of the protestors became violent towards the Serbs. 
Milosevic, angered by what he saw, stepped on the balcony of the town hall and 
screamed, “No one should dare beat you. This is your land; these are your houses, your 
                                                 
24 Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? 128. 
25 Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundation of Modern Politics (New 
York, NY: The Free Press, 1994) 300. 
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memories. You should stay here in sake of your ancestors and descendents.”26 The Serbs 
of Kosovo began to attack the protestors until they left the town square. Milosevic soon 
returned to Belgrade and grew to be the most prominent political figure in Serbia. He 
marginalized moderates and gained the support of the Yugoslav Army to expand his 
influence.  
The republics were suspicious of Milosevic’s motives and eager for 
independence. On 26 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their separation from the 
federation. On 8 September 1991, Macedonia would follow suit. The Socialist Republic 
of Yugoslavia was no more. Milosevic resisted but could not prevent Slovenia and 
Macedonia from their departure. Croatia on the other hand had a large Serbian minority. 
Such was the case in Bosnia when they looked for independence the following year. 
Serbian minorities in fear of being ruled by Croats or Muslims took up arms against the 
states with the support of Milosevic.  
War in Croatia occurred from 1991 to 1995, while war in Bosnia occurred from 
1992 to 1995.  The end result was the Dayton Peace Accords signed on November 9, 
1995. Both countries would eventually become independent but not before ethnic 
cleansing was committed. Violence would continue in the Balkans. The progressive 
breakup of Yugoslavia, along with the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, 
gave rise to a guerilla Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) movement, which led to a 
continuous cycle of attacks and counter attacks between the Serbs from Serbia and the 
Kosovo Albanians. 27    
                                                 
26 John G. Stoessinger, Why nations go to war, (Thomson Wadsworth, USA, 2005), 137. 
27 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, Civil-Military Relations (Harvard, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 273.   
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B. THE BIRTH OF THE STATE 
In this part of the world it is difficult to find the true path between reason 
and emotion, myth and reality. This is the burden of the Balkans, which 
prevents us from becoming truly European. –Kiro Glogorov First 
President of the Republic of Macedonia28 
In early 1991, SR Macedonia had to make quick decisions regarding its future. To 
remain in the federation meant its participation in the conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia, 
along with potential conflict in Bosnia. If SR Macedonia chose the wrong side, it risked 
missing the opportunity to claim its independence. This was a concept that Macedonian 
nationalists had craved for centuries.29 There were several factors SR Macedonia had to 
consider before pursuing sovereignty. Within the federation, SR Macedonia was 
supported economically and militarily. Alone, SR Macedonia was a poor, land-locked 
country, whose neighbors would question its legitimacy. Greece would be sensitive 
towards an independent state called Macedonia because it claims such a name steals from 
the history between ancient Macedonia and Greece. Serbia would deny autonomy of a 
separate Macedonian Orthodox church. Lastly, Bulgaria would deny the existence of a 
separate Macedonian language and nation.30   
In the fall of that year, SR Macedonia would hold a referendum where a large 
majority of the electorate voted for independence. A new constitution was drafted and 
approved by legal experts of the EU. SR Macedonia would now call itself the Republic of 
Macedonia. Its first President was Kiro Glogorov. Independence also brought an end to 
the government’s one party system where a number of political parties would emerge 
such as nationalists, former communists and ethnic groups. One such party, the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National 
                                                 
28 BNET Business Network, Macedonia: end of the beginning or beginning of the end, Parameters, 
Spring 2002, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_1_32/ai_107216060, accessed May 13, 2008. 
29 James Pettifer, The Macedonian Question (New York, NY: Palgrave, 1999), 206. 
30 International Crisis Group, “Macedonia’s name: Why the dispute matters and how to solve it,” 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1688, 1, accessed May 17, 2008. 
 26
Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), a leading nationalist party, pledged to work for the ‘ideal of all 
free Macedonians united’ in a Macedonian state.31  
In early 1992, President Glogorov began the pursuit of international recognition 
for the Republic of Macedonia. The greatest barrier for recognition of the ROM came 
from the Greeks. There were reports of nationalistic rhetoric within some political 
spheres of Macedonia, calling for a reunification of Macedonia to its original borders. 
This included maps illustrating “Solun” (the Macedonian name for Thessaloniki) in a 
form of greater Macedonia. Tito’s propaganda campaign ran deep into the Macedonian 
educational system and it was that message that created hurdles for Macedonia’s 
recognition as a state. Greeks still felt the pain brought on by Tito’s ambitions to reunify 
all of Macedonia during its civil war. Although Macedonia was a weak state and in no 
position to claim territory to the south, Greece maintained a strong position in defense of 
their land and culture.      
On December 17, 1991, the parliament in Skopje adopted a formal declaration of 
recognition to the European Union. In a hearing, the European Commission (EC) decided 
to recognize Slovenia and Croatia but not Macedonia. The commission concluded that 
Macedonia satisfied the criteria for recognition and did not have any territorial claims 
(also stated in its constitution).32 Since Macedonia had no threat of violence compared to 
Slovenia and Croatia, the commission delayed its recognition due to Greece’s objection 
of the country’s use of its name and symbols that were Hellenic.  
Without a foreign policy strategy for independence along with its poor economic 
status, Macedonia went through a very hard time. In January-February 1992, the State’s 
energy and food reserve could last only a few months. Within the same timeframe, 
Greece initiated a blockade of its northern border towards Macedonia. The UN declared 
sanctions and an embargo against Serbia closing its southern border. Production in 
                                                 
31 International Crisis Group, “Macedonia’s name,” accessed May 17, 2008.  
32 In the Macedonian Constitution, Amendment I states that the Republic has no territorial pretentions 
towards neighboring states; its borders can only be changed in accordance with the constitution, the will of 
its people, and by acceptable international norms.  
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Macedonia fell 50% compared to 1989.33 Since the country was isolated and desperate, 
fears were that it would be annexed or divided by its neighbors. 
Macedonia finally got some relief from these pressures when Bulgaria recognized 
it in January of 1992, which allowed for supplies and resources to enter from the eastern 
border. President Grigorov petitioned London for international recognition. He pleaded 
that he would develop a state that would protect human rights, guarantee inter-state 
borders with the flow of goods and services, create good neighborly relations, and set 
policies that would move Macedonia towards European integration. The EC would pass 
the debate over the recognition on Macedonia to the UN to the chagrin of the Greeks.  
Since the situation in the Balkans was quickly worsening, Grigorov requested a 
UN protection force in Macedonia. UNPROFOR was established to provide a tripwire in 
preventing the war from spreading.34 Though it was small in force, it provided a 
symbolic victory of recognition. This allowed for normal relations to begin with the UN 
nations, which eventually led to more countries recognizing Macedonia. On April 7, 
1993, UN Security Council Resolution No. 817 recognized Macedonia under a 
provisional name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM).  
Greece and the ROM would also compromise on an issue concerning the flag. 
With the signing of the Interim Accord in September 1995, the ROM would change its 
flag design, which portrayed the symbols of the Macedonian dynasty of Philip II. The 
Accord would allow the ROM to receive recognition from Greece as a state while the 
borders between the two countries were reopened. Today, the name dispute remains an 
issue without a resolution. Though Greece remains the ROM’s top trading partner, the 
arguments over the Macedonian history ignites sensitivities on both sides.    
Despite its difficulties, the ROM held together. It formed a new government and 
political system. Kiro Gligorov would maintain power from 1991 to 1999. He was the  
 
 
                                                 
33 Pettifer, The Macedonian Question. 208. 
34 Paul F. Diehl, International Peace Keeping (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), 192. 
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leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDSM) made-up mostly of former communists. 
Gligorov was praised for preventing conflict and gaining international recognition of the 
country.  
The ROM has a 120-seat National Assembly, along with its popularly elected 
President. There are many Macedonian political parties. The two most powerful are the 
SDSM and the VMRO-DPMNE.35 Minority groups are also allowed to create their own 
parties. The largest minority, ethnic Albanians, created parties such as the Democratic 
Alternative (DA), Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the Democratic 
Party of the Albanians (DPA). Once parliamentary elections are held, the winning 
Macedonian party creates a coalition with an Albanian party of its choice to take up the 
majority seats in the assembly. 
The SDSM, which ruled the government from 1991-1998, came under heavy 
scrutiny for its lack of economic reform and allegations of corruption. In November of 
1998, the former communist leadership was voted out in place of the VMRO-DPMNE.  
In 1995, the United Nations imposed an embargo on Serbia. With the lack of 
goods entering Serbia, the smuggling of weapons, narcotics, and fuels was being 
conducted by organized crime groups. The UN embargo only reinforced profits going to 
these groups. It is argued that a criminal network was tied directly to the ruling 
government that worked as corrupt coalitions dividing control over the borders. Political 
parties would campaign for the national interest of their voters while in fact conspiring 
with the other side over the riches.36 Brenda Pearson, a Balkan political analyst explains:   
Political party membership is the determining factor for employment in 
Macedonia. Thousands of people are purged from their jobs in the public 
sector and from the state enterprises when political power changes hands. 




                                                 
35 The VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for 
Macedonian National Unity) was founded in 1990, and is made up of a combination of Macedonian exiles 
and nationalist. The name VMRO was taken in respect of the famed Macedonian rebels of the prior 
century.    
36 International Crisis Group, “Macedonia’s Public Secret: How corruption drags the country down,” 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1693&l=1, 3, accessed May 28, 2008. 
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from their employees. Thus, the country’s workforce is by and large only 
too happy to comply with this Faustian bargain because it keeps them in 
power.37    
In the late 1990s, corruption was widespread throughout the civil and public sector. A 
1999 World Bank study found that the country had a highly underdeveloped public 
administration and a lack of control and accountability mechanisms within the state. Both 
Macedonians and Albanians feel a great separation between them and their politicians. A 
survey in 2001 showed public trust at 12%.38 Citizens all agree that the biggest problems 
facing the ROM are the rule of law and political connections needed get ahead in society.  
1. The Albanian Minority: Their Marginalization within the ROM    
 The Albanians are the largest minority within the ROM. They make up 25% of the 
population. They mainly occupy the cities of Tetovo, Gostivar, and Skopje. During the 
referendum for ROM independence in 1991, two thousand Albanians marched in Tetovo 
demanding their own independence and unity with Albania. This protest was broken up by 
Macedonian paramilitary police.39 The republic’s insecurity as a nation was demonstrated 
within the early years of the state. First, in 1991, they worded their Constitution to separate 
Macedonians from other minorities.40 The Albanians considered this as reducing Albanians 
and other groups to second-class citizens. Second, the ethnic makeup of the parliament was 
mostly Macedonian with little minority representation. Thus, the Macedonian majority could 
control any issue pertaining to minorities. Third, they removed the right for minorities to fly 
their motherland or symbolic flags for display. The old communist regime formerly allowed 
flags to be hung on certain occasions.   
                                                 
37  Suzette R. Grillot, Wolf-Christian Paes, Hans Risser, and Shelly O. Stoneman, “Fragile peace: Guns 
and security in post-conflict Macedonia,” 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan019254.pdf, 8, accessed February 8, 2008.  
38 International Crisis Group, “Macedonia’s Public Secret,” 5, accessed May 30, 2008. 
39 Pettifer, The Macedonian Question 138. 
40 The 1991 Macedonian constitution stated, “Macedonia is established as a national state of the 
Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian 
people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities living in the Republic of 
Macedonia.”  
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In 1992, the ROM was dealing with an increasingly vocal Albanian minority. 
Their protest of the government increased while the government’s political elite lost 
patience. In Skopje, four Albanians were killed when paramilitary police fired into a 
crowd during a protest. In the town of Gostivar in 1997, three Albanians were killed and 
the mayor arrested over a dispute over flying the Albanian flag at the town hall.  
Fear of a secessionist’s movement led to more extreme attempts by the 
government to keep the status quo, which led to the arrest of prominent Albanians by the 
Interior police charging them with attempting to overthrow the state.41 The situation 
worsened when in 1997, the government in Albania fell into near crisis.42 Weapons 
caches were looted and made their way to the ROM borders. This provided an increase of 
arms to the organized crime and drug organizations.  
Educational rights for the Albanians also worsened. It became a rarity for 
Albanians to receive a higher education. In 1991, only 303 ethnic minorities attended 
universities.43 In 2001, only 4.9 % of Albanians participated in higher education.44 An 
Albanian language university was established in 1995 in Tetovo but it was seen as illegal 
by the government. It did not receive state funding and was accused by the Macedonians 
to be an institution promoting secessionist movements. Students who numbered around 
4,000 were often harassed as they attended.45 Access to higher education was easier 
under Communist rule. Most Albanians would go to Pristina University in Kosovo before 
Serbia reduced their autonomy. Also, schooling in Albanian was allowed in ten 
                                                 
41 Pettifer, The Macedonian Question, 140. 
42 The Soviet collapse marked a difficult period for Albania. In the early 1990s, a host of refuges fled 
to Greece and Italy. The government faced a crisis in inflation and unemployment. In 1997, protestors took 
to the streets to protest a government corruption scheme. Riots broke out, and the country nearly fell into 
civil war. A large amount of weapons was taken from the country’s ammunition caches and depot. This 
contributed to weapons proliferation in Kosovo and the ROM.    
43 Kristina Balalovska, “The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series, Macedonia 2006: Towards 
Stability?” http://www.ethnobarometer.org/pdf/wp11.pdf, 41, accessed June 15, 2008.  
44 Judy Batt, Misha Glenny, Denisa Kostovicova, Nicola Mai, Madege Ragaru, Fabian Schidt, and 
Miranda Vickers, “Chaillot Paper, Is there an Albanian question?” 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp107.pdf, 45, accessed June 14, 2008. 
45 Pettifer, The Macedonian Question,” 142.  
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secondary schools. By mid-1993, there was only one.46 Primary and secondary schools 
for Albanians were mostly separated and based on a Macedonian government approved 
curriculum. In May of 1998, the newly elected VMRO-DPMNE worked to improve 
Albanian rights by recognizing the University.  
The Albanians also claim they make up 35-48% of the population. In the 1994 
census, they were shown as having only 25%.47 The Albanians blame this on strict 
citizenship requirements that were purposely enforced to minimize Albanian influence in 
the country. Lastly, Albanians were poorly represented in the civil service. There was no 
Albanian judge, and very few Albanians employed in ministries. In 1998, only 8% were 
employed in the Ministry of Interior and only 3% within the Ministry of Defense. The 
Ministry of Defense established a 22% quota system for ethnic minorities for police, but 
only a few completed the program. The lack of education and training put minorities at a 
huge disadvantage compared to ethnic Macedonians. Unemployment held steady for all 
citizens of the ROM. It varied from 35 to 40% throughout the 1990’s. This was blamed 
on slow reform policies, inability to attract foreign investment, and a centrally controlled 
government that failed to stretch its influence to the local municipalities. This caused a 
call for the decentralization of the government to allow greater autonomy at the local 
level. In 1996, a plan for local-self government was passed, but was slow to be 
implemented. 
During the 1990s, the ROM focused on recognition and its transition from 
communist structures to a democratic, free-market state. Its poor institutional capacity 
and economic record made it difficult to provide effective political goods, as stated in 
Chapter II, which led to the poor ethnic accommodation by the government. Also, 
Macedonian nationalism saw Albanian rights as a direct threat. Professor of 
Anthropology Loring M. Danforth stated, “Any diversity of cultures, traditions, or 
identities that exist when a nation-state is formed, becomes with the creation of a natural 
                                                 
46 Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? 185. 
47 Ibid., 188. 
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culture, a threat to national unity.”48 In turn, the unity of Macedonia, which was seen as 
essential for their survival, was threatened by the ethnic Albanians.  
Below highlights the ethnic Albanians’ political and cultural grievances based on 
a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report to U.S. Congress in November 2001.49 
The tipping point was when 250,000 Albanians from Kosovo flooded the ROM borders 
following the Serb incursion in 1999. The ROM government initially accepted the 
refuges but then closed its borders asking them to go elsewhere. This action along with 
ethnic tensions within its borders would lead to ethnic conflict in early 2001.  
 
Ethnic Albanian grievances:  
• Greater cultural rights such as the hanging of symbolic flags and icons 
• Recognizing the Albanian language in its constitution. Force institutions to 
provide services in both the Macedonian and Albanian language 
• Educational rights such as state support for the University, more Albanian 
teachers, a voice in the academic curriculum 
• Greater representation in the government, public service, armed forces, and police 
• Constitution preamble refers to Macedonian nation. Albanians portrayed as 
second-class citizens. Albanians claim to represent 40% of population versus 25% 
that the Macedonian government claims 
C. 2001 ETHNIC CONFLICT: THE BREAKING POINT   
 In January of 2001, an attack occurred at a police station in Tearce, which left one 
Macedonian police officer dead. The group that claimed responsibility called itself the 
National Liberation Army (NLA) whose leader was identified as Ali Ahmenti. The 
government claimed the group was a copycat of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
The government became critical of NATO for its handling in disarming Kosovo rebel 
forces, which led to their infiltration into the ROM. The NLA would announce its 
                                                 
48 Danforth, “The Macedonian Conflict,” 20.  
49 Formulated by the CRS Report for Congress, “Macedonia: Country Background and Recent 
Conflict,” November 2001, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30900.pdf, 4-5, accessed January 20, 2008. 
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campaign for the liberation of ethnic Albanian territory and the fight for equal rights of 
Albanians in the ROM. Additional demands called for federalization, changes to the 
constitution, and the release of political prisoners. Clashes between the NLA and 
Macedonian police and security forces broke out in the northwest portion of the country. 
It was uncertain what the makeup of the rebel activity was. The number of rebels ranged 
from 2,000 to 5,500 strong.50 Weapons typically came across the border from Kosovo.  
The ROM government downplayed the power of the NLA. They called their 
statements propaganda in trying to divide the country at a critical moment. Political 
hardliners called them separatists looking to create a greater Albania. A group called the 
Albanian National Army (ANA), emerged and rejected any reconciliation with the 
government and vowing to continue the fight for a greater Albania. Security forces 
conducted constant air and ground raids on NLA and rebel strongholds. 
 The United Nations encouraged the republic to adopt a political rather than a 
military solution. They requested that both the Macedonian and Albanian leaders create a 
dialogue towards a resolution. Talks began in April 2001 and included members from all 
of the republic’s political parties. President Trajkovski (leader of VRMO-DPMNE) 
refused to meet with members of the NLA, although the Albanian political parties did 
have side dialogue with the NLA. International mediators from the UN, EU, and US were 
sent to oversee the negotiations. Fears of conflict spillover were their main concern. 
Talks continued despite ongoing hostilities. Attacks were initially only between rebels 
and security forces, but deaths sparked riots between ethnic Macedonians and Albanian 
civilians. 
There were ceasefires, but some viewed these as opportunities for rebels to re-
supply. The government would then form an all-coalition political party in hopes of 
increasing dialogue and maintaining a cease-fire. Then, on August 13, 2001, the political 
leaders signed a peace agreement; as sporadic clashes were still ongoing throughout the 
country, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was signed. There was also dialogue 
between the NLA and NATO. On August 19, Ali Ahmenti announced that his NLA 
                                                 
50  Grillot, et al., “Fragile peace,” 20, accessed February 8, 2008. 
 34
would respect the ceasefire and hand over weapons to NATO. In exchange for the 
weapons, President Trajkovski agreed on a partial amnesty deal with the NLA. 
The origins of the conflict are debated. As stated, organized crime and smuggling 
networks were widespread throughout the eastern Balkans. Since the smuggling routes 
ran into Kosovo and Serbia, various Albanian groups had control over these enterprises. 
It is believed that those criminal elements were directly linked to the Albanian DPA 
party. Several members of the NLA reported that they only raised arms to challenge the 
DPA’s control on the smuggling routes.51 In turn, Albanian rival groups forced the 
country into a civil war. Ali Ahmenti stepped up to control the NLA. He eventually 
would be seen as an Albanian folk hero who stood up for Albanians tired of corruption. 
Ahmenti also saw the timing of the events in Kosovo were in his favor. With 
international sympathy high, he could use this advantage to obtain more concessions for 
Albanian rights.  
 Corruption among the political elites was also blamed for the conflict. The 
International Crisis Group Balkans report listed two general schools of thought linking 
corruption to the conflict:52 
• The “grand conspiracy” school. Some believe that the corrupt 
ruling who already divided turf for personal economic gain, 
wanted to incite a war to formally divide the country. Another 
theory was that they staged the war to distract the public from a 
wiretapping scandal that included members of the goverment. 
• The “capacity building/weakening’ school. Argument is the 
organized crime elements united and recruited extremists to 
weaken the central government and prove it as illegitimate. Reason 
for action was either ideological (DPA’s inability to promote 
Albanian rights) or purely for economic gain.    
Once a cease-fire was reached, NATO initiated Operation Essential Harvest. Its objective 
was to collect arms and ammunition voluntarily handed-in by Albanian rebels.   The 
mission was intended to show good faith by the NLA in complying with the cease-fire. 
                                                 
51 Brenda Pearson, United States Institute for Peace, “Putting Peace into Practice: Can Macedonia’s 
New Government meet the Challenge?” http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr96.html, 4, accessed 
April 4, 2008. 
52 International Crisis Group, “Macedonia’s Public Secret,” 24, accessed May 29, 2008. 
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The NATO Secretary General wrote a letter to President Trajkovski stating the operation 
would be confined in scope to the collection of weapons’ and would be deployed for a 
limited duration of time.53 The force consisted of 4,500 soldiers. Overall, NATO troops 
collected and disposed of 3,875 weapons and 397,625 mines, explosives, and 
ammunitions handed in by the NLA.54 NATO claimed the mission a success by 
surpassing their goal of 3,000 weapons collected. Unfortunately, the ROM government 
and community did not have the same assessment. Many argued that the weapons 
collected were old and obsolete. Concerns were that more modern weapons were hidden 
in weapon caches throughout the country. Following Operation Essential Harvest, a 
secret weapons cache was discovered with rocket launchers, machine guns, and anti-tank 
mines. Overall, NATO’s mission did reduce the weapons arsenal of the NLA, though it 
did not fully demobilize them. This could have been the NLA’s plan, in case their 
demands were never fully met  
D. THE OHRID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF 
IMPLEMENTATION    
 On August 13, 2001, the Framework Agreement was signed. Its purpose was to 
secure the future of the ROM and integrate relations with the European Community. Over 
50% ethnic Macedonians thought that the agreement was an insult because many 
concessions were given to the Albanians due to international pressure. The Albanians 
saw it as a victory but were skeptical that there would be full and effective 
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Table 4.   Highlights of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and government reforms 
 
Basic Principles of OFA            
1.1: The use of violence in pursuit of political aims is rejected completely and unconditionally                   
                                                                           
1.2: Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity  and the unitary character of the State are inviolable 
and must be preserved                                                   
 
1.3 The multi-ethnic character of Macedonia’s society must be preserved and reflected in public life 
Power Sharing Principles   
1: A revised Law Self Government that reinforces the powers of local officials and enlarges their 
competencies                            
 
2: The principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment will be applied with respect to employment in 
public administration and public enterprise  
 
3: Legislation concerning the vital interest of minorities will be passed via a double majority ruling. Vital 
interests includes laws affecting culture, use of language and symbols of minorities 
  Cultural & Educational Rights                       
Article 7 (2): Language:  Any language spoken by at least 20% of the population is an official language 
                                                                              
Article 45: Citizens have a right to establish private schools at all levels of education, with the exception of 
primary education          
                                             
Article 46: The autonomy of universities is guaranteed. The conditions of establishment,   
performance and termination of the activities of a university are regulated by law                                             
Other Reforms 
1: Local heads of police will be selected by municipal councils. Police forces will generally reflect the 
composition of the population of Macedonia 
 
2: Judicial system reform that will weed out corruption and train more Albanian judges  
 
3: The invitation of the international community to assist in political, judicial, and economical   
development of Macedonia 
 
4: Institutional reform that will further Europeanize the ROM’S institutions in hope of integration into the 
European Union                                                                                                                                                    
 





Most ethnic Macedonians feel that the OFA was forced on them by the 
international community because stability with the Albanians took precedence over their 
own interest. To them, the OFA gave enormous advantage to the Albanian position in the 
country. They felt that Albanian radicals could use the benefits for secession. They felt 
that reforms meant the loss of jobs within the civil and public sector that would go to less 
qualified Albanians in an extremely difficult job market. They feared decentralization of 
the government would turn towns into ethnic Albania enclaves where politically and 
culturally the Albanians would have complete control in areas where they were the 
majority.  
The leading political leaders stated their commitment to the OFA but there would 
be obstacles in its implementation. The first challenge of the OFA was the shifting of jobs 
and public spending from the central government to local authorities.55 Special training 
was needed to increase the competency of those members who were assuming 
responsibility. Also, a clear plan needed to be developed to explain decentralization to the 
average citizen. The second challenge was dealing with ethnic Macedonian nationalists 
who refused to accept power sharing. What could strike fear into their hearts was the 
transformation of the ROM into a multi-ethic state supporting minority rights. To 
nationalists, the ROM was supposed to be the reward for centuries of struggle for 
political freedom. 
The third challenge was the government’s reconciliation efforts with former 
members on the NLA. The popular Ali Ahmenti, whose influence during the conflict 
brought in the spectrum of the ROM politics, created an Albanian party called 
Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). He personally supported the OFA, but it was 
unclear how much unity there is within his party since many like himself were former 
members of the NLA. The group was not a part of negotiations in Ohrid.  
Lastly, politicians would face difficulty in winning votes on a pro-OFA campaign. 
If ethnic Macedonians felt further implementation meant fewer benefits for them, votes 
would go towards candidates promoting ethnic agendas. Former Minister of Foreign 
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Affairs of the ROM Denko Maleski stated, “Ten years of nationalism makes the new 
democratic strategy unpopular with the Macedonian people, and there is no politician in 
the world that would like to be unpopular.” Others felt that the government first needed to 
build the confidence of the people by proving itself legitimate. Former Economic Advisor 
to the ROM Sam Vakin stated, “The political class in Macedonia of both ethnicities is 
irreversibly discredited by its own venality, corruption, electoral fraud, and involvement 
in criminal activities.” Overall, only 19% of Macedonians saw the implementation of 
OFA as essential versus 97% of Albanians. Decentralization was supported by 33% of 
Macedonians, and 84% of Albanians.56   
Despite the negative tone within the country, there were reasons to feel 
encouraged about OFA’s implementation and other reforms. During the 1990s, the ROM 
was virtually on its own in dealing with its problems. The crisis in the Balkans brought 
the EU, IGOs, NGOs and foreign aid into the region, which would help with institutional 
reform and development. In 2001, the ROM signed the Stabilization and Association 
agreements with the EU, which forced reforms pertaining to political, economic, trade, 
and human rights. This was seen as the first step towards EU membership. The crisis 
brought in foreign experts who would guide the administration towards EU standards. 
Though corruption would still be a problem, there would be more oversight of public 
officials to ensure benchmarks would be met for EU admission.   
The remaining portion of this thesis will evaluate the political, economic, and 
social reforms addressed in the OFA, assistance provided by the international 
community, and the ROM’s prospects for EU membership. Table 5 compares the 
reforms, which would be initiated by the government post-Ohrid, with the four desired 




                                                 
56 ProQuest, “Macedonia Politics: Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement,” http://proquest 
.umi.com/pqdweb?index-8&sid=3&vinst=PROD&fmt=3&star, accessed February 6, 2008.  
 39
Table 5.   Matching the four desired end states with post Ohrid reforms 
1. Stable Democracy Post Ohrid legislation relating to 
democratic reform 
A. Build legitimate institutions at the state, regional, 
and local level. Ministries and civil service sector 
must be reliable, efficient and maintain integrity 
 
B. Allow the concept of power sharing in a multi 
ethnic state. This includes equal     representation of 
minorities within the state and local level, and 
decentralization to allow greater autonomy of ethnic 
groups. 
 
C. Provide mechanism that would provide oversight 
into corruptions within the state’s political and civil 
body. 
 
1. A revised Law of Self Government that 
reinforces the powers of local officials and   
enlarges their competencies                            
 
2. The principle of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment will be applied with respect to 




3. Legislation concerning the vital interest of 
minorities will be passed via a double majority 
ruling. Vital interests includes laws affecting 
culture, use of language and symbols of minorities 
 
4. Institutional reform that will further Europeanize 
the ROM’S institutions in hope of integration into 
the European Union                                                       
2. Secure environment and Rule of Law Post Ohrid legislation relating to 
security and rule of law 
A. Security forces which protect international 
borders, key infrastructure, and airspace. 
 
B. Police forces that are transparent, accountable, 
protect human rights, build civilian confidence and 
represent the ethnic makeup of the land. 
 
C. Build a legitimate and accountable judicial 
system that supports the states constitution, laws, 
and properties. It also must be open to all ethnic 
groups and its application treating all equal. It must 
ensures judges are selected based on merit and not 
political favoritism 
 
1. Local heads of police will be selected by 
municipal councils.  
 
2. Increase the number of police officers to 
proportionally represent the population of the 
community 
 
3. Invite the international community to assist in 
police reform which will provide technical 
expertise, technical training, and resources in order 
to develop a transparent multi ethnic force  
 
* The OFA did not stress judicial reform which 
would eventually become a hot topic years later 
 
Table 5 continued on next page 
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Table 5.    Continued 
3.  Sustainable Economy Post Ohrid legislation relating to 
economic reform 
A. Build effective and reliable financial and 
economic institutions, promote private business and 
entrepreneurship and attract foreign investment by 
accommodating international business 
 
B. Reconstruct and invest the states infrastructure 
such as transportation and communication. 
 
C. Creates policies that would fight unemployment 
and train a viable workforce 
The OFA did not stress specific economic reform. It 
did stress decentralization of authority to the local 
level, equal representation of the workforce, and 
institutional reform The document focused on 
ethnic issues but it was widely agreed that the 
conflict took on an economic component. The ROM 
government would take on major economic 
programs with the help of the EU, IMF and the 
World Bank. Its reforms will be discussed in 
Chapter IV.   
 
4.  Social Well-Being Post Ohrid legislation relating to social 
change 
A. Recognize and promote group political, cultural, 
and educational rights. Allow minority groups the 
opportunity to express their identity in a method 
accepted by the state.  
 
B. Provide equal education to all ethnic groups such 
as opportunities for advanced education, which 
helps assimilation into the workforce.   
 
C. Promote a peaceful existence between ethnic 
groups by workshops for breaking barriers 
1. Language:  Any language spoken at least 20% of 
the population is an official language 
                                                                              
2. Citizens have a right to establish private schools 
at all levels of education, with the exception of 
primary education          
                                             
 3. The autonomy of universities is guaranteed. The 
conditions of establishment, performance and   
termination of the activities of a university are 




IV. POST-OHRID TO PRESENT: IMPLEMENTING THE OHRID 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT AND REFORMING THE STATE 
A.  THE EUROPEAN UNION: ITS ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
The ethnic violence in the Balkans forced EU member states to rethink their 
methods of long-term stabilization of the Balkans. EU policy-makers pointed out that 
nationalism, ethnic hatred, social inequalities, and human rights violations were the root-
cause of conflict.57 Following the NATO military interventions in the Eastern Balkans, 
the EU would focus its attentions on the long-term development of the region. To prevent 
future wars, it created mechanisms for conflict prevention such was the Stability Pact for 
Eastern Europe. It was created in 1999 as a strategy to build the democracies of South 
Eastern Europe in hopes of maintaining peace and providing economic prosperity.58 The 
Pact does not provide financial resources, but is a temporary body of leaders of both 
South East Europe (SEE) and the international community, who work on strategies in 
different areas, such as democracy, economy and security.59 Currently, Albanian, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro 
Romania and Serbia are members. 
The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was created to facilitate progress 
towards the reconstruction and development of SEE nations. The overall effort is to 
integrate Balkan countries towards European standards. Under the process, countries that 
wish to join the EU must make political, social or economic reforms. In return, they may 
be offered access to some of the EU markets. This is written within the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and the member state. Commitments for 
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reform must be made in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria established by the 
European council in 1993. According to the criteria, prospective EU members must abide 
by the following three conditions:60  
• Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;  
• The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
• The ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
The ROM was the first SEE country to sign a SAA agreement in April 2001. 
Under the agreement, the ROM would receive financial assistance from the Community 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization (CARDS) program. As of 
December 2000, CARDS has been the EU’s principal instrument for financial assistance 
to the region. The full financial envelope for 2000–2006 for CARDS is € 5.13 billion for 
South East Europe.61 Aid offered by the EU is allocated within various sectors of reform 
such as justices and home affairs, administrative capacity building, economic and social 
development, environment and natural resources, and democratic stabilization. Tables 6 
and 7 show the distribution of funds throughout South East Europe and the ROM. The 
main facilitator towards institutional building and reconstruction is the European Agency 
for Reconstruction (EAR). The agency was established in early 2000 and has served as 
the Balkans’ main reconstruction element. It works as an independent agency within the 
EU and reports directly to the Council and European Parliament of the twenty-seven EU 
member states.  
In 2007, a new funding method was established. The Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA), which replaced CARDS and created a more defined 
framework for delivering funds to EU prospective members. IPA consists of five 
                                                 
60 European Commission for Enlargement, 
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components: (1) Transition Assistance and Institution Building, (2) Cross-Border Co-
operation with EU Member States, (3) Regional Development (transport, environment 
and economic development), (4) Human Resources Development (strengthening human 
capital and combating minority exclusion), and (5) Rural Development.62 
 





                                                 
62European Commission for Enlargement, Instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA), 
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 Country or Sector  2000 2001 2002  2003 2004  2005   2006  TOTAL 
Albania  33.4 37.5 44.9 46.5 63.5 44.2  45.5  315.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  90.3 105.2 71.9 63.0 72.0 49.4  51.0  502.8 
Croatia (transfer to pre-accession from '05)  16.8 60.0 59.0 62.0 81.0 -  -  278.8 
The Republic of Macedonia  13.0 56.2 41.5 43.5 59.0 45.0  40.0  298.2 
Serbia and Montenegro  650.5 385.5 351.6 324.3 307.9 282.5  257.5  2559.8 
Interim Civilian Administrations  10.0 24.5 33.0 32.0 35.0 36.0  35.0  205.5 
Regional  20.2 20.0 43.5 31.5 23.0 47.9  43.5  229.6 
Other  141.5 118.0 11.0 17.0 22.5 19.7  16.1  345.8 
Macro-Financial Assistance (grants) 70.0 120.0 100.0 15.0 16.0 33.0  50.0  404.0 
TOTAL  1045.7 926.9 756.4 634.8 679.9 557.7  538.6  5130.2 
Croatia, pre-accession 2005-6            105  140  245 
TOTAL including Croatia, 2005-6            662.7  678.6      5375.2
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Table 7.   CARDS allocation 2002–2006 to the ROM (million €) 
Sector  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Justices & Home Affairs  7 12.5 24 9.5 7.6 60.6 
Economic & Social Development  11.5 11 15 8.6 13.1 59.5 
Environment, Natural Resources  - 1 2 2 1.3 6.3 
Democracy & the rule of law 17 12 11.5 17 10.1 56.6 
Other  6 7 6.5 7.9 7.9 35.3 




The EU is not the only donor contributing to the ROM. The IMF supports the 
country with a stand-by agreement (SBA), allowing macroeconomic stability to be 
maintained. The World Bank has offered yearly loan agreements along with technical 
expertise. In 2000, the ROM signed the Millennium Declaration with the United Nations. 
The program was established as a global partnership for fighting the world’s main 
development challenges such as poverty reduction, education, maternal health, gender 
equality, and child mortality.63 Those challenges are broken into eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Other major donors to the ROM include the Netherlands, 
the United States (through USAID), Germany, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland. 
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
During the peace negotiations in Ohrid, the ROM political parties agreed to unite 
under an all party-coalition. This lasted only until the 2002 parliamentary election, with 
the coalition separating to its original format divided between the nationalists and 
socialists. During the election, The SDSM-DUI won an overwhelming victory where its 
                                                 
63 United Nations Development Program, Millennium Development Goals, 
http://www.undp.org.mk/default.asp?where=weblinksm&link=91, accessed June 18, 2008. 
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primary agenda was to push for OFA implementation and improve the republic’s 
economic, political, and security situation. The party quickly worked to push legislation 
though ethnic tensions remained high.  
In February 2003, two Polish NATO soldiers and two civilians were killed when a 
car hit a landmine in a small, mostly ethnic Albanian village. When a Macedonian police 
unit entered to clear the village, police tactics were criticized as being forceful, which 
resulted in the death of an ethnic Albanian. An extremist group, the Albanian National 
Army (ANA), threatened to break the peace.64 Fortunately, the influence of the ANA did 
not reach mainstream ethnic Albanians who mostly saw the implementation of the OFA 
as the best way to improve their lives.  
In February 2004, the ROM President Boris Trajkovski died in a plane crash. He 
was seen as the country’s most trustworthy politician. In March of that year, riots in 
Kosovo added to the political instability within the region. Fortunately, the ROM was 
able to conduct peaceful elections in April. Former Prime Minister Branko Crevenski 
won the presidency and set a goal to transfer power from the central government to local 
authorities. That month, the ruling coalition of the SDSM-DUI opened negotiations to 
refine the boundaries of the municipalities. With the country’s 2002 census, the 
municipalities were to be redrawn to represent the fair ethnic distribution within the 
country. In closed-door negotiations, the coalition was proposing to reduce the number of 
municipalities from 123 to 83. The opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE, along with a new 
coalition member, the World Macedonian Congress, opposed the plan and seized the 
opportunity to delay the process by igniting ethnic tensions. 
Ethnic Macedonians’ growing fears were that the redrawing of municipalities 
would force ethnic Macedonians to sacrifice more influence to Albanians by increasing 
the number of Albanians within municipalities that were occupied mostly by ethnic 
Macedonians. Former Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski stated, “The agreement on 
territorial boundaries is a new form of ethnic cleansing of the ethnic Macedonians from 
Western Macedonia.” Led by DUI chief Ali Ahmenti, the DUI aggressively pressed their 
                                                 
64 Grillot et al., “Fragile peace,” 9, accessed February 8, 2008.  
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SDSM coalition partner for an increase of municipalities that could be controlled by 
ethnic Albanians. The opposition played on fears that this agreement would be the first 
step towards Albanian succession.   
The opposition parties collected over 180,000 signatures and eventually forced a 
national referendum in November 2004. The ruling government was quick to defend its 
party’s position. President Crvenkovski argued that “decentralization is the most 
important part of the Framework Agreement.” Ahmenti wrote an open letter to the 
Macedonians: “Shall we participate in a referendum, thus becoming a stumbling block 
for our country’s integration into the EU, or shall we vote for Europe by ignoring the 
referendum? Shall we vote for the future or the past?”65  
The EU also pressed Macedonians to ignore the referendum.  To the EU, success 
of the referendum would derail progress made since the 2001 conflict. EC President 
Romano Prodi presented a speech in front of the Macedonian Parliament calling 
decentralization “a method of founding stable and deep roots of local democracy. Europe 
is here, at the reach of your hands… However, the decision depends on you…to whether 
you want Europe.”66 The United States also played a role in influencing the referendum. 
Just hours before the vote, Washington officially announced it would now recognize the 
Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name, Republic of 
Macedonia. This decision gave a great last-minute boost to the ruling government. The 
U.S. had delayed its recognition so as not to harm relations with Greece over the name 
issue.  
On the referendum, only 26% voted no on the redrawing of the municipalities — 
much less than the 50% expected. The results showed that despite the differences 
between the ethnic groups, the referendum was not worth going to war. Overall, 
Macedonians were most concerned about rising unemployment, and the weak economy. 
                                                 
65 International Crisis Group, “Macedonia: Not out of the Wood Yet,” 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1244, 3, accessed May 16, 2008.  
66 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Not out of the Wood Yet, 4, accessed May 16, 2008.  
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In a poll, 39% cited unemployment, 19% cited the economy, and only 3.2% cited 
decentralization as their greatest concern.67 
The ruling government of the SDSM-DUI survived the referendum, but would 
lose the 2006 Parliamentary elections to the VMRO-DPMNE. The party’s leader,  Nikola 
Gruevski, took the Prime Ministership. Gruevski grew as a popular political figure within 
the ROM, building his political success by focusing on economic issues. He is young, 
energetic, and sees the EU as the doorstep towards obtaining economic prosperity and 
boosting self-confidence in the ROM. Once, he took office, the government announced 
an economic plan to revitalize the economy, mostly by a team of young professional 
technocrats who had professional experience in the U.S. Unfortunately, his government 
faced another crisis. 
After the 2006 parliamentary elections, the DUI expected to join the VMRO-
DPMNE coalition. The DUI succeeded in receiving a majority of the Albanian votes by 
campaigning for an increase in Albanian rights. However, the VMRO-DPMNE chose in 
favor of a smaller, less influential partner, the Democratic Party for Albanians (DPA). 
This led to strong opposition by the DUI, whose leaders boycotted parliamentary 
sessions. Some radical elements of the party threatened to renew violence. Through 
international pressure, both sides were able to negotiate an agreement on outstanding 
issues. The DUI lost credibility with the ethnic Macedonian public with the stance they 
took, and viewed the DUI as not committed to the progress of the ROM.  
The ROM faced a number of political crises that threatened to derail 
implementation of the OFA. With the help of the international community and moderates 
within the government, the ROM continued to progress. Every time there is a new 
political crisis, however, important legislation and reforms are delayed. The political 
spectrum of the republic may be years from removing the old habits inherited from the 
former Yugoslavia. The following section focuses on the implementation of Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, international support, and political, economic, and security 
reforms initiated by the government.  
                                                 
67 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Not out of the Wood Yet, 5, accessed May 16, 2008.  
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C. FOUR DESIRED END STATES: GOALS TOWARDS STRENGTHENING 
THE STATE 
1.  Stable Democracy 
The major change brought on by the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) is the 
concept of power-sharing governance. Power sharing is seen as tool for governance of a 
multi-ethnic society. Power-sharing systems usually have three major features. These are 
community autonomy norms under which ethnic communities have self-government over 
the matters of most concern to them: proportional representation, employment and 
expenditure rules that apply throughout the public sector, and constitutional vetoes for 
minorities.68   
In the case of the ROM, the power-sharing model actually admits the division of 
the society along ethnic lines.69 The OFA introduced power sharing in three main areas. 
These are the decentralization of power to local authorities; equitable representation of 
minorities in the public sector; and the adoption of the Badinter principle, which allows 
pieces of legislation affecting rights of minorities to be passed only with a double 
majority (of majority parliament members, and members representing communities not in 
the majority).  
a. Decentralization 
Decentralization is defined as devolving responsibilities for public service 
from national ministries to local governments, and endowing local governments with 
authority to raise revenues from their own sources to finance those services.70 
Decentralization also transfers responsibility of certain functions to the local level such as 
                                                 
68 Minority rights group international, Emerging Frameworks of Power-Sharing in South East Europe 
Strengths and Weaknesses, www.adi-
macedonia.org/Downloads/publications/PowerSharing2003Report%20(ENG).pdf, 1, accessed April 10, 
2008.  
69 Mirjana Maleska, “New Balkan Politics, What kind of political system did Macedonia get after the 
Ohrid Peace Agreement?” http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/napis.asp?id=31&lang=English, 4, 
accessed November 12, 2007 (as of August 3, 2008, this link was unavailable).  
70 Robert W. Rafuse, Jr., “USAID Local Government Reform Project, Why fiscal decentralization in 
Macedonia?” info.worldbank.org/etools/library/latestversion.asp?128831, accessed December 10, 2007.    
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urban planning, culture, education, health care and environmental protection. The theory 
is to give governance to those who better understand the local situation. An alternate 
view is that decentralization might intensify regional tensions by creating competition 
between municipalities.71 Table 8 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of 
decentralization.  
Table 8.   Advantages and Disadvantages of Decentralization 
Model         Advantages   Disadvantages 
Delegation     Faster implementation   Difficulty to maintain 
         quality and efficiency 
         if the decentralized units 
         are to fragmented  
De-Concentration                               Reduced need for central                             Wide variations in practice 
Decision-making is transferred          administrative bodies                                   (The rights hand does  
To a lower administrative civil          Local innovators                                           not know what the left  
Servant level                                implemented                                                 hand is doing)  
Privatization     Activities independent from                          Emergence of private 
                                                           politicians who may not be  monopolies that may 
     capable of making decisions  exploit their power 
      or are unclear about their role  
Source: The International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Decentralization and healthcare in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Menon (March 7, 2006). 
 
When the ROM became independent, powers formally controlled by the 
municipalities were transferred to the central government. This included control of 
education, health care, welfare and culture. When their economy began to stabilize, the 
government tried to Europeanize its structures by redirecting back to the municipalities. 
In 1995, the ROM established the 1995 Law on Local Self-Government. 
The law provided regulation, outlined responsibilities for local authorities, and 
encouraged citizen participation in making local decisions. It was looking for ways for 
local governments to be less economically dependent on Skopje. It made commitments to 
the European Charter of Local Self, and, in 1998, the Ministry for Local Self-
Government (MoLS) was created.  Slow legislative reform, along with ethnic tensions, 
                                                 
71 Sonia Menon, The International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Decentralization and 
healthcare in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia March 7, 2006, 4, 
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/hpm.823, accessed November 14, 2007. 
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delayed the law. The OFA called for a rework of the Law of Self-Government (adopted 
in January 2002), which defines the specific roles, competencies, and structure of the 
municipalities that will assume the control. The Law of Local Self-Government was 
followed by the Law on Financing of the Units of the Local Self-Government (July 
2004).  The Law on Territorial Organization (August 2004) followed those, and was the 
most controversial, leading to the national referendum in November 2004.      
There is one main problem with decentralization in the ROM: it is one of 
the most centralized countries in the world. In 1996, local government spending was only 
1.8% of the ROM’s GDP, compared to 9.0% among members of the EU at that time. 
Also, local governments in the ROM created only 20% of their revenue; the remaining 
revenue was provided by the central government, compared to 55% by local governments 
of the EU.72   
In the spring of 2004, the first order of business for the SDSM-DUI 
coalition government was the redrawing of the municipalities within the ROM. To 
facilitate the decentralization process, the EU recommended a reduction of the number of 
municipalities, which then stood at 123. That was to allow greater power to the 
municipalities and provide more balanced ethnic representation. The ruling party, behind 
closed doors, constructed a draft that left some 55% of the municipalities untouched, but 
drastically changed the boundaries of others. Overall, they reduced the number of 
municipalities from 123 to 83. Under the draft legislation, Albanians would now become 
the majority in the city of Struga and make up 20% in Skopje. Under the OFA, if a 
minority makes up 20% of the population, that minority’s language becomes an official 
language. Also, Albanians would now make the majority in two of the ten municipalities 
in Skopje. Lastly, the city of Kosovo would also change its borders in 2008, making it 
majority Albanian and further reducing the number of municipalities.73  
With the failure of the referendum of November 2004, the implementation 
of decentralization laws moved forward, but problems remained. Local mayors have 
                                                 
72 Rafuse, Jr., “USAID Local Government Reform Project,” 3, accessed December 10, 2007.    
73 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Not out of the Woods Yet, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1244, February 25, 2005, 2 accessed May 16, 2008.  
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often complained that the process has lacked a clear strategy for implementation. They 
point to a lack of communication and consultation with the central authorities, lack of 
information and transparency, unrealistic timelines, competing ministries and 
bureaucratic foot dragging.74  
The public was also suspicious about the decentralizations process. Ethnic 
Macedonians fear that greater autonomy of the Albanians will lead to federalization, then 
possible succession. Also, because the political decisions and legislation were made 
secretly, the legitimacy of the reforms collided with public trust. The lack of an 
information campaign created assumptions about the true intentions of decentralization. 
The government’s reputation for corruption gives it an Achilles heel with any reform 
legislation it tries to pass. In 2005, the ROM remained unprepared for the process of 
decentralization. A European police official stated, “No one is explaining decentralization 
to the average man. What’s the benefit to him? You need to start with streetlights, 
parking, ID cards, and education.”75  
That year, the USAID-funded the Institute for Regional and International 
Studies monitored the ROM decentralization process and offered the following 
recommendations: 
• Prepare and launch a public information campaign. The shortage of 
knowledge on decentralization is a major handicap of the reform. 
Furthermore, the non-transparent way of decision making is badly 
hurting the legitimacy of decentralization. 
• Institutionalize consultation mechanisms with the broader civil 
society, especially local civil organizations. Establish civil society 
as the major ground for inter-ethnic understanding and 
involvement of citizens in the local decision-making process.  
• Establish public-private partnerships with local governments to 
help funding, training, budget allocation, and the protection of 
local community rights. 
                                                 
74 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Not out of the Woods Yet, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1244, February 25, 2005, 8 accessed May 16, 2008. 
75 Ibid.  
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• Assert on every occasion the European perspective of the country 
as this is the main source of mobilization across ethnic and 
political lines.76  
Although the process of decentralization between 2001 and 2004 was 
marked with political stalemates, lack of a unified strategy, and poor legislative 
execution, the government has made significant improvements in the recent years. New 
legislation created a guide for transferring competencies in the Program for 
Decentralization of Powers (OPDP) in 2003–04 followed by a detailed plan for Transfer 
of Competencies and Resources in the Process Decentralization (DPTCR) adopted in 
2005.  
There are two major phases in the process of decentralization. The first is 
the transfer of competencies and resources from the central to local government across a 
range of sectors, which started on July 1, 2005. This would allow local governments the 
authority to collect the taxes necessary to build revenue. The second phase is the transfer 
of block grants, which was to begin in January 2008.77 This is the transfer of money to 
local governments, which allows them to spend it as they see fit. The block grants are 
generally attached with general provisions on how it is to be spent. Since the first phase, 
progress with the legal and regulatory frameworks for transferring functions, the ROM 
ruling government has implemented two-thirds of the required laws in the transferring of 
functions. Table 9 highlights the number of laws passed — based on the sector as of the 
end of 2006. Appendix A highlights reforms spearheaded by EAR, UNDP, and other 
IGOs and NGOs towards decentralization in the ROM.  
                                                 
76 The Institute for Regional and International Studies, The Process of Decentralization in Macedonia: 
Prospects for ethnic conflict mitigation, enhanced representation, institutional efficiency and accountability, 
http://www.iris-bg.org/files/Macedonia%20Decentralization%20Report.pdf, 2006, 30, accessed March 4, 
2008. 
77 EAR-former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia-Annual Programme 2006, 
http://www.ear.eu.int/macedonia/main/mac-annual_programme_2006.htm, accessed May 14, 2008. 
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Table 9.   Numbers of laws passed, as of end of 2006 
Source: Decentralization Review, EU CARDS TAD Project, November 200678  
 
Overall, the ROM has transferred the majority of sectors to the local 
government. With the help of international organizations, an information campaign on 
decentralization has taken place. Agencies such as EAR, UNDP and USAID have provided 
training and technical assistance in increasing the competencies of local officials. In 2007, a 
report was produced on fiscal decentralization in the ROM, and was presented at the Fiscal 
Decentralization Conference in Skopje in November 2007. In the opening remarks, UNDP 
Resident Representative in the country, Ms. Maria Luisa Silva Mejias stated,  
The assessment validates the general recognition that the decentralization 
reforms have significantly advanced in the past years. Decentralization 
reforms are complex and long processes even in stable and advanced  
societies. The consolidation of the new territorial map and progress in the 
transfer of implementation of the new competencies are commendable 
achievements.79       
                                                 
78 Nicoletta Feruglio, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Andrey Timofeev, Fiscal Decentralization in 
Macedonia: An Assessment, 12, europeandcis.undp.org/poverty/show/5B200599-F203-1EE9-
BA05A61F1BD91926, accessed June 2, 2008. 
79 United Nations Development Program, Fiscal Decentralization Conference, November 5, 2007, 
http://www.undp.org.mk/default.asp?where=news&id=390&start=1, accessed June 4, 2008. 
Sector Laws (Adopted/Total) By-Laws* (Adopted/Total) 
Urban Planning 9/11 17/27 
Local Economic Development 8/12 3/3 
Culture 5/5 5/8 
Education 3/3 5/16 
Protection and rescue of citizens 
and goods 
2/2 43/46 
Environmental Protection 4/7 21/29 
Communal services 14/15 6/12 
Social and child protection 3/3 10/11 
Sport and recreation 1/1 1/3 
Health Care 2/2 - 
Total 51/61 112/159 
Outstanding 10 47 
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The decentralization process has come a long way in the ROM. Despite its 
initial difficulties, local authorities have finally been given the responsibility to govern 
and, in time, their abilities will mature. The important point is that the first phase has 
been implemented. Political divisions in the central government impeded the progress in 
decentralization due to their inability to reach a consensus on the redrawing of 
boundaries, although political will and international pressure allowed the process to 
progress successfully.  
b. Equal Representation 
During the 1990s, ethnic Albanians argued that they were greatly 
misrepresented within the ROM’s civil service, public administrations and municipalities. 
Other minorities were also underrepresented within the employment sector, including the 
Turks, Roma, Vlachs, Serbs and Bosniacs. Unemployment in the ROM has fluctuated 
between 35 to 40% since its independence. The demographics show that most ethnic 
Macedonians live in urban areas that provide greater employment opportunities. Most 
minorities live in the rural areas where their livelihood is based on agricultural work. 
It can be argued that the imbalance in employment is due to two reasons. 
First, farmers in rural parts may not see the need to educate their children, since they need 
them to work in the fields. Thus, they miss out on opportunities for professional 
employment. Second, the ROM is known to have a large grey market, which inflates 
unemployment numbers. A counterargument would be that despite the large grey market, 
the Albanian ethnic minority, which makes up 25% of the population, was greatly 
represented prior to the Ohrid Framework Agreement. In 1993, only 3% of ethnic 
Albanian citizens were employed in public administration.80 In 2001, the Interior 
Ministry had only 4.5% of ethnic Albanians. Table 10 highlights employment and 
population by minority. 
                                                 
80 Kristina Balalovska, The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series, Macedonia 2006: Towards 
Stability? 25, http://www.ethnobarometer.org/pdf/wp11.pdfPg,  accessed June 15, 2008.  
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Table 10.   Employment percentage per population compared to national census 
Source: http://www.cea.org.mk/Documents/First_USAID_report_labor_final_4.pdf 
 
The Principle of Equal Representation was confirmed in the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement. It states,  
Laws regulating employment in the public administration will include 
measures to assure equitable representation of communities in all central 
and local public bodies and at all levels of employment within such 
bodies, while respecting the rules concerning competence and integrity 
that govern public administration.81  
The first reform executed by the government was within parliament. The 
concept of power sharing refers to greater representation and control for minorities within 
the legislative branch. An amendment to the Law on Election of Members of Parliament 
in 2002 allowed for an election of the 120 parliament deputies under a proportional 
system. This would force a higher threshold of minority representatives within 
parliament. Under the law, the ruling political party needed to include not just an 
Albanian party within its coalition, but also a third party to obtain its majority.  
                                                 
81 Ohrid Framework Agreement, August 8, 2001, Section 4.2, 
http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf, accessed January 15, 2008.  
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459,200            83.5% 
53,566              9.7% 
12,474              2.3% 
7,416                1.3% 
3,589                0.7% 
N/A           N/A 
1,155                0.3% 
N/A           N/A 
537,800               97.8% 
1297981                64.2% 
        509083                25.2 % 
77,959                3.9% 
35939                 1.8% 
53879                 2.7% 
17018                 0.8% 
 9695                  0.5% 
20993                 1.0% 
2022547             100% 
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In July 2002, the Civil Service Law was amended, enforcing specific 
quotas to be fulfilled within certain professional sectors. It enforced the concept of 
positive discrimination in the employment of ethnic groups, which created initial 
problems. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have 
suggested that meeting the government’s quotas within the police has forced some 
unqualified recruits to graduate from the police academy. Also, some of the ROM’s main 
lenders, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EC, have demanded cutbacks in 
public spending as reforms. This could ultimately lead to layoffs, which could affect 
Macedonians since nobody may want to alter the minority quota.  
Thus, positive discrimination may solve the ethnic disparity of the 
country, but could lead to the marginalization of the ethnic Macedonians. This is just as 
undesirable as was the alienation of the Albanians. Equitable representation must mean 
fair representation of all ethnic groups if it will be successful. Prime Minister Nikili 
Gruevski is aggressively pursuing economic reforms in areas such as attracting foreign 
investors and developing the private business market. More jobs must be created to avoid 
an outcry against the positive discrimination policy. 
Though there was a law requiring quotas for equal representation, the 
ROM lacked a nationwide strategy to implement this task. In January 2007, the 
government drafted the Strategy for Equitable Representation of Non-majority 
Communities in the Republic of Macedonia, providing guidance for equal representation 
in civil service and public enterprises. The government is now working on a National 
Employment plan that will work in unison with this strategy.  
Overall, reform with regard to equal representation is taking place. Since 
the OFA dealt mainly with Macedonian and Albanian issues, the increase of the ethnic 
Albanians within the workforce is significant. In 2001, Albanians made up only 3% of 
the police force, and was also greatly under-represented within the military and judiciary. 
In 2006, Albanians accounted for 14.9% of those employed within the Justice and Home 
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Affairs Office.82 The government is addressing Albanian inequality within the workforce, 
but it will need to focus on economic reform to increase the pool of employment to fulfill 
the needs of all citizens, not just cater to the ethnic Albanians in fear of renewing conflict.    
c. The Badinter Principle 
Prior to the OFA, within the Macedonian assembly, Albanian parliament 
deputies complained of marginalization in decisions dealing with ethnic issues. Under the 
old majority system, ethnic Macedonians theoretically could team up and vote against a 
law since they held a strong majority. The OFA solution was to create a double majority 
vote or Badinter Principle; specifically, certain laws that deal with the vital interest of 
minorities need to be passed by a majority of votes within the assembly that includes a 
majority of votes within the assembly and members who “claim to belong to the 
communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.” In essence, this 
provides some form of veto protection to minorities against what is called issues of vital 
interest of ethnic minorities. Under the amendment in the Macedonian Constitution, these 
protected interests include “laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, 
personal documentation, and use of symbols.”83  
The Badinter principle works by protecting minorities from majority 
voting; on the other hand, it could have a destabilizing effect on the power-sharing 
system.84 The ethnic Albanians could use their veto protection to slow the efficiency of 
the assembly. Also, the principle favors only the Albanian minority. If other minorities 
feel that their vital interests are being violated, they need the Albanians onboard to 
initiate the veto. Albanians have enough numbers in parliament to veto without other 
minority members.  
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Any deadlock with the assembly is brought to a Committee for Inter-
Community Relations. The role of the committee today is to “consider issues of inter-
ethnic relations” and “make appraisals and proposals for their solution.”85 This includes 
any deadlock within the assembly regarding the double majority rule. Until 2006, the 
committee stated there had been no deadlocks in the assembly due to the double majority 
rule. The same year, EC Ambassador to Macedonia Erwan Fouere stated, “Local parties 
should prepare a list outlining which laws are subject to the so-called Badinter 
Principle.”86 Though the vital interest was defined in the OFA, no specific laws were 
attached to the principle, which left room for interpretation.   
In late 2006, the assembly was trying to pass legislation on police reform. 
The DUI insisted that this legislation required a Badinter majority, while the VMRO-
DPMNE coalition insisted otherwise. In January 2007, the DUI boycotted the Parliament, 
charging the ruling government of marginalizing them and violating the Badinter 
principle.87 Political dialogue resumed between both parties until another roadblock 
appeared. In September 2007, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski submitted a draft that 
would extend voting rights to Macedonians in Diasporas, while also increasing the 
number of minorities in the assembly from 120 to 133.  
The plan came under heavy criticism by the opposition party SDSM. They 
claim that such legislation would violate the Badinter principle because this new proposal 
specifically dealt with vital interest of minorities. They threatened to abandon Parliament 
if the legislation passed. The DUI submitted 4,100 amendments of its own and called for 
                                                 
85Ohrid Framework Agreement, August 8, 2001, Annex A:  
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a debate on each in hope of delaying the process.88 The Prime Minister called for a two-
stage process in passing the law, which would open the floor for debate.  Dialogue has 
since resumed, but unless this principle is clearly defined, political deadlocks will 
continue to occur. 
2.  Rule of Law and Security 
a. Police and Border Control 
Since independence, the ROM police have been criticized for their human 
rights violations of minorities and their political connections to the government. During 
the 2001 conflict, the international community noted the deficiencies of the police force. 
The executive director of human rights watch for the Europe and Central division, 
Elizabeth Anderson, stated, “Persistent police abuse in Macedonia is simply shocking. 
Macedonia must urgently address the violence in its police stations. Ethnic Albanians are 
being severely abused, and in some cases beaten to death, without the slightest prospect 
of accountability.”89   
During the ethnic conflict, the SDSM government created a special tactics 
police force called the Tigers. This unit fought against the NLA, but was seen widely by 
the public as a political protection force.90 The VMRO-DPMNE complemented the 
Tigers with a quick reaction unit of reservists called the Lions. Representatives from 
NATO and the OSCE claimed most of the initial recruits were criminals and thugs who 
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were given arms with very little training.91 The Tigers were forced to demobilize and 
integrate into the civilian police force. As for the Lions, Amnesty International continues 
to report on ill treatment towards Macedonian citizens, specifically towards members of 
Muslim faith and the Roma.92   
Other problems include poor control of the country’s borders. With the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, the government has undertaken the responsibility of guarding the 
borders with Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, Greece and Bulgaria. Since the government lacked 
the capacity to secure its borders, the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and goods became a 
lucrative business. It contributed to a large black market within the Eastern Balkans. 
NATO Secretary George Robertson, at a border conference in May 2003, stated,  
Organized crime is able to cross the Balkans so easily, which creates the 
perfect condition for drugs, arms and people trafficking, terror and 
political violence. All this poses a real threat for the stability of the region, 
complicating the reform there and giving bad headaches to Europe.93   
2000 and 2003, EAR conducted an assessment of Macedonian border 
security. The following is a list of the conclusions of their survey: 
• The ROM reforms tend to be from the top down, whereas on-the-ground 
personal have difficulty understanding and implementing initiatives. 
• The border security agencies do not know how to properly evaluate 
intelligence, which leads to smuggling activities going unchecked.  
• There is a lack of communication between checkpoints because the agencies 
lack the technology and resources to link up.  
The conflict brought a number of international missions into the ROM. In 
2000, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) 
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was established to provide technical assistance and help develop a professional standards 
unit. The OSCE established a mission in the ROM and created a Police Development 
Unit focused on reform in accordance with the OFA. In December 2003, the EU executed 
its first security mission, called Proxima. It involved 200 unarmed police officers who 
were to monitor, mentor and advise the police force. The mission replaced Concordia, 
which officially ended a foreign military presence in the ROM. Lastly, EAR provided 
assistance in training, administrative, technical and logistical support. EAR and the 
OSCE have been the greatest catalysts in reforming the civilian police. Appendix B 
highlights activities by both agencies.  
The Ohrid Framework Agreement enforced initiatives towards 
establishing and training a police force that represented the ethnic makeup of the 
community. It also involved the municipalities in the selection of their police chief.94  In 
2006, the Assembly passed the New Law of Police, aimed at building a police force that 
was transparent, accountable, and based on promotion of merit, not favoritism. Since 
2001, reforms have been impressive. Albanian representation within the police has 
increased, and Albanian police participate in multiethnic patrols of the communities. The 
Interior Ministry has assumed responsibility for the border police, established a police 
academy and an organized crime unit, and created community-based outreach mechanism 
to encourage citizen engagement.95   
Improvements to the capacity of the police and border control force are 
significant. The OSCE and EAR have aided in getting the force closer to EU standards, 
but it will still take time for the civilian police force to be the transparent and accountable 
force it needs to be. The NGO Macedonian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 
(MHC) continues to report cases of torture and ill-treatment of civilians. The MHC has 
also accused the Ministry of Interior of failing to conduct investigations according to 
internal procedures, domestic law and international standards. 
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b. Judicial Reform 
The ROM judicial system has gained a reputation for being politicized, 
inefficient, and corrupt. In 2004, there were one million court cases in a country of over 
two million.96 In a audit by the EC Justice & Home Affairs mission to the ROM, they 
found that the average caseload for a judge was 800 cases, compared to the EU standard 
of 200 to 300. Not only is the judicial system slow and inefficient, but it also lacks 
transparency.  In 2006, a report from the International Crisis Group stated: 
Day-to-day judicial operations are hamstrung by ineffective summons, 
bail and sentencing systems, various cycles of non-appearance and delays, 
rogue prosecutors, and a lack of security of court officials and witnesses. 
Limited training or professional development opportunities, a general lack 
of respect for procedure and court culture of blame and malaise have 
created a situation where the system functions.97 
The case of Rastanski Lozja is a prime example of a poor Macedonian 
judicial system. In March 2002, six Pakistanis and one Indian were captured at the 
western Macedonian border with forged travel documents. After a few days in detention, 
they were brought to a deserted area and executed. The three police officers and a 
businessman stood trial for the crime and were acquitted in 2005 — despite 
overwhelming evidence against them.  The ruling and judicial procedure for the trial were 
met with wide criticism by the public, judicial officials, and international experts. The 
opinion was that evidence was planted to portray the defendants as terrorist whose 
mission was to blow up embassies in Skopje.98 
The OFA outlined reforms in the judiciary as it pertained to equal 
representation. The OFA declared that three of the seven members of the Republic 
Judiciary Council, the body that elects judges in the ROM, are to be elected by 
Parliament under the Badinter double majority system.  This provision also applies for 
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three of the nine judges in the Constitutional Court.99 Despite the amendment, the OSCE 
stated that “both the current structure and composition of the Republican Judiciary 
Council as a political-appointed body are counterproductive to the aim of achieving 
equitable representation.”   
The Ohrid Framework Agreement stressed equal representation within the 
judiciary, but it did not address reform. The ROM government was slow to act on reform 
until criticism came from Brussels. In 2004, the government submitted their application 
for membership to the EU. Upon review of the application, Brussels stated that, although 
economic and political reforms had been significant, little or no attention had been given 
to judicial reform.  
In late 2004, under heavy international pressure, the ROM government 
published its first judicial reform strategy. The next year, the parliament voted 
unanimously on a package of amendments for reforms on the creation of an efficient 
case-handling process, mechanisms to reduce the large number of minor cases, witness 
protection, and establishment of an anti-corruption commission. The EAR has been 
helping to reform the Justice & Home Affairs office in Skopje (see Appendix B) but, 
based on EU assessment, progress has been slow. With the ROM’s candidacy on the line, 
judicial reform is now a government priority, though the EU has pressed the country not 
to be too hasty with reforms in order to regain their credibility.     
c.  Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) and NATO 
The ARM consists of an Army and Air Force. It was created in 1991, once 
the ROM became independent. When the ROM seceded from the federation, the 
Yugoslavian Army took back fifty-five combat aircraft and more than 450 armored 
vehicles and tanks, along with stockpiles of ammunitions.100 The ARM was left with 
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little more than obsolete weapons and tanks within their defense supply. During the 2001 
ethnic conflict, the ROM succeeded in receiving military equipment and supplies from 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, and the Ukraine. As of 2003, the ARM consisted of 12,000 
professional and conscript soldiers. The concept for the future of ARM is a light, mobile, 
professional army centered on Special Forces.101 As of 2008, over 200 special force  
soldiers in Iraq and in Afghanistan are conducting raids, patrols and guarding 
checkpoints. NATO has played an integral role in providing expertise on the 
modernization of the ARM.  
On April 2, 2008, the Bucharest summit reviewed applications for 
admittance into NATO from Albania, Croatia, and the ROM. Prior to the conference, 
Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis told reporters that Athens would support the 
admission of Albania and Croatia into NATO, but could not back the ROM and would 
veto its request.102 Athens’ position was that the name Macedonia implied a territorial 
claim on the northern region of Greece, also called Macedonia. According to officials in 
Skopje, the Greeks have breached the 1995 Interim Accord in which Athens would agree 
not to block “membership in international, multilateral, and regional organizations and 
institutions.”103 Athens contends that although the ROM rejects territorial claims within 
their constitution, the radical claim of northern Greece remains. High government 
officials, textbooks, and official government maps depict Greek Thessaloniki as 
Macedonian.  
During the summit, NATO decided to deny the ROM’s admission into the 
alliance. Once the decision was announced, the ROM officials conducted a walkout in 
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opposition to the decision, stating that it would undermine stability in the Balkans. 
NATO officials stated that talks will remain open for future accession once the name 
dispute is resolved. Athens has insisted on renaming the Republic of Macedonia in a 
fashion that separates it from its northern region, such as “New Macedonia” or “Upper 
Macedonia.” 
After seventeen years, a permanent solution still has not been reached. UN 
envoy Matthew Nimitz was sent to help Athens and Skopje find a solution that would be 
acceptable to both sides. He presented a set of five possible alternative names: 
Constitutional Republic of Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Macedonia, Independent 
Republic of Macedonia, New Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Upper Macedonia. 
Some of the names were not well received, with thousands of protests from the ROM and 
in Thessaloniki, the capital of Macedonia in northern Greece. The negotiations between 
Nimitz and the two sides are ongoing.  
3.  ECONOMIC PROSPERITY  
The development of the ROM’s economy has been a difficult transition since its 
independence. First, it faced the transformation from socialist economic structures to a 
market-oriented system. Second, it was dealt a blow with sanctions imposed on Serbia, 
then the trade embargo imposed by Greece. The combination has created high 
unemployment and a low public trust of the government and state institutions. The Ohrid 
Framework Agreement did not specifically address economic development. The 
document’s main focus was inter-ethnic issues through political dialogue, though it 
recognized that ethnic and ideological division would be a major impediment towards 
economic stability.  
 As of 2005, unemployment was at an all-time high of 37.3%.104 The grey 
economy made up 45% of domestic activities, while Foreign Direst Investment was one 
of the lowest in the region. The state of the economy was marked by poor governance in 
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the private and public sector, unfavorable investment climate, corruption, and a weak 
judiciary that depresses domestic and foreign investment and hinders economic and 
employment growth.105  
Unemployment remains the biggest problem in the ROM, especially with young 
adults. As of 2003, unemployment of those between the ages of 15-24 was 65.7%, 
between 25-29 at 50.8%, and 30-39 at 37.9%.106 Basic labor market indicators show that 
labor force participation is barely above 50% (Table 11). One argument for the high 
numbers is the large grey market. Family farms, rural workers, and casual labor could 
accounts for a large portion of the grey market as would the illegal activities within the 
borders. Many of these grey-market dependents are uneducated and live below the 
poverty line. As of 2003, 22.6% of the population lived under the poverty line of $50 a 
month, as measured by international standards.107   
In combating unemployment, the World Bank recommended that the government 
must create a climate of foreign investment and accelerate free trade.108 Problems with 
executing those reforms in the short term were due to the poor government capacity to 
promote domestic reform, and a reputation of corruption scared foreign investors away. 
The country would need donor assistance in strengthening its industrial sector and in 
rural development. It would have to integrate its informal grey sector with its formal 
economy. Also, since the ROM was promoting equal representation, it needed to provide 
alternative employment opportunities for ethnic Macedonian citizens affected by positive 
discrimination. 
In an EU evaluation of the ROM economy, they spotted a number of deficiencies 
that needed immediate attention. The country’s major transport infrastructure needs 
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repairs to facilitate external trade and movement of goods. It needs upgrades in 
wastewater treatment systems in order to improve its environmental standards. The 
country should reform its labor market, which shows geographical and ethnic disparities 
in employment. Lack of long-term and youth employment was seen as the biggest 
concern. There is a lack of investment in the quality of education, particularly in higher 
education. The country needs to invest in human capital to align itself with EU standards. 
Lastly, the agriculture sector is dominated by small family farms with a lack of irrigation, 
land fragmentation and lack of proper management systems.  
 
Table 11.   ROM employment indicators 
 
     Source: http://www.cea.org.mk/Documents/First_USAID_report_labor_final_4.pdf 
Table 12.   ROM economic indicators 
    Source: www.nbrm.gov.mk/WBStorage/Files/Economis_Indicators_a_1993_20070.pdf 
          
Indicators 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Working age 1,489,625 1,518,250 1,554,420 1,579,500 1,579,450 
Employed 512,301 545,222 599,308 545,100 545,108 
Unemployed 288,213 261,451 263,196 315,900 315,868 
Labor Force 800,514 806,673 862,504 861,000 860,976 
Participation 
Rate 
53.7% 53.1% 55.5% 54.5% 54.5% 
Indicators 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
GDP -7.5 -1.1 1.4 4.3 -4.5 2.8 4.1 
Inflation 229.6 9.2 4.5 2.3 3.7 2.6 1.2 
Unemployment 27.7 35.6 36.0 32.4 30.5 36.7 37.3 
FDI in mln Euro N/A N/A 27 31 493 81 79 
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Table 12 shows improvements in the ROM economy as the 1990s progressed, as the 
country benefitted from the lifting of Serbian sanctions and reestablishing trade with Greece. 
GDP, FDI and inflation figures improved but unemployment remained a problem. After the 
2001 conflict, insecurities over stability lead to a sharp decrease in growth and a steady rise 
in unemployment. The government focused on the OFA implementation while legislation for 
economic reform lagged. Loans from the World Bank and the IMF helped build economic 
capacity, along with projects facilitated by EAR and USAID (see Appendix C)  
 In 2006, Gruevki was elected on a campaign focused on economic reform and EU 
integration. In office, his team of young, American-educated economists released a program 
for the economic reform. It was aimed at improving the living standard of the population, 
increasing employment, fighting corruption, developing democracy, improving inter-ethnic 
relations, increasing political stability, and integration into the EU and NATO.109 The pillars 
of the program are the following:  
• Employment: Create investment conditions and development of the private 
sector by reforming tax measures, diminishing legal regulations and 
administration barriers in business. 
• Increasing competiveness: Assist Macedonian companies through 
decreasing working expenses, new investment cycle, transfer of knowledge 
and technology from foreign firms that would invest in the ROM, as well 
as improve education and qualifications of labor force.  
• Increasing domestic and foreign investment: By providing stability and 
predictability of regulation, efficient executive procedure, protection of 
creditors, decreasing public consumption, improved public services 
quality, improved public infrastructure and more efficient judiciary.  
• Decreasing public consumption and efficient state administration: Create a 
small but efficient state administration devoted to meeting needs and 
development of its citizens.  
• Maximally reducing of bureaucracy and corruption: Extensive 
deregulation and the introduction of mechanisms that would allow 
citizens to monitor work of the state administration.  
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Since 2005, economic development has been significant in the ROM. GDP 
exceeded 5% in 2007, and growth in industrial production exceeded 10% in early 2008, 
though inflation has increased due to higher food and energy prices. 110 The IMF praised 
to the ROM during a review of the Stand-Bu Arrangement with the ROM, stating, 
“Economic growth has been robust, the fiscal position has strengthened, and foreign 
direct investments and international reserves have increased.”111 In June 2008, Prime 
Minister Nikola Gruevski was presented in New York with the World Bank award for the 
ROM’s reform performance for 2007.112 The country was ranked fourth top reformer 
based on a World Bank 2008 Doing Business report. It stated that the ROM eliminated 
the minimum capital required for business start-up, expedited the administrative 
procedures, eased entry of new firms, cut taxes, and launched a commercial credit bureau 
whose reports provide credit exposure of companies.113     
The ROM also jumped 21 places in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index from 105th place in 2006, to 84th place in 2007. The progress was the 
largest of any of the other 179 countries surveyed.114 In a meeting with EU Finance 
ministers about the status of the ROM’s economic policies, Finance Minister Trajko 
Slavaski stated, “I am glad to say that 2007 economic results in Macedonia are the best in 
17 years, with positive trends in all economic sectors.” Table 13 shows economic 
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State Statistical Office (SSO) of the ROM claimed that the number of domestic tourists 
has increased 29.9%, and the number of foreign tourists has increased for 20.1% in May 
2008 compared to May 2007. 115     
 
Table 13.    Recent economic indicators 
       Source: www.nbrm.gov.mk/WBStorage/Files/Economis_Indicators_a_1993_20070.pdf 
 
Overall, the ROM economy has made an impressive recovery. The main reasons 
for its success have been foreign aid provided by international donors, the lack of a major 
outbreak of violence, speedy legislation reform, and EU pressure for reform. The country 
is still years away from sound economic stability and growth. Its unemployment rate still 
remains the highest impeding factor to economic prosperity. Corruption is still having a 
destabilizing affect on reforms. The reform of the judicial system is a priority to help 
clean up the other sectors of the economy.    
4.  SOCIAL WELL-BEING 
 The main grievance voiced by the ethnic Albanians during the 1990s was their 
need for greater cultural and educational rights. The OFA was a document focused on 
providing greater accommodation for the minorities of the ROM. Regarding cultural 
rights, the agreement stated that “members of communities have a right freely to express, 
foster and develop their identity and community attributes, and to use their community 
symbols.”116  
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 The issue has caused controversy in the past and present. The 1997 riots in Tetovo 
and Gostivo are not forgotten. The controversy was about flying flags over municipal 
buildings, press conferences and public celebrations. This became especially sensitive in 
the implementation of decentralization because ethnic Macedonians feared that greater 
Albanian autonomy would mean an increase of the double-headed black eagle flag being 
flown, which is the same as the Albanian national flag. This is a symbol to many ethnic 
Macedonians of Albanian nationalism and interest towards succession. In 2005, debate 
ensued over whether there should be legislation over the flag issue. Many politicians 
feared that if emblems were not clearly defined, spoilers would use ethnic symbols to 
inflame ethnic tensions. This remains the case in Tetovo, where there is exclusive use of 
the Albanian flag at the Albanian local university, which continues to anger 
Macedonians.117   
 The OFA specifically notes that “with respect to emblems, next to the emblem of 
the Republic of Macedonia, local authorities will be free to place on front of local public 
buildings emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority in the 
municipality, respecting international rules and usages.” 118 Although Prime Minister 
Gruevski denies that there is a need for legislation on the use of emblems, calling it a 
“non-issue,” sensitivities towards the use of flags and symbols could ignite riots. For 
example, if the local police see an Albanian flag by itself posted over a building in a 
mostly Albanian populated area, are they prepared to pull it down possibly triggering a 
riot? Legislation would force the participation of the Albanians into a consensus on this 
issue.    
Another issue concerning cultural rights of the Albanians is the language issue. 
Albanians requested their language become official, so they could receive services in 
both Macedonian and Albanian. The OFA answer to this issue was the 20% rule: where 
any minority that makes up 20% of the population in a municipality, that language 
becomes an official language. This includes receiving official government documentation 
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in that language and translation services by the local government.119 Though this pleases 
the Albanians, a fear is that greater language rights would make Albanians unmotivated 
to learn Macedonian, affecting their assimilation and further dividing the society along 
ethnic lines.  
In terms of educational rights, the Albanians requested state funding of their 
University in Tetovo, created in 1996, and greater representation in higher education.  
They did not receive state funding — considered illegal by the government. The 20% rule 
allowed for the university to receive funding. Also, the government was pressured by the 
international community to open private, more independent universities. In July 2000, the 
government passed the Law on Higher Education authorizing the opening of private 
institutions. That year, the Southeast European University opened, providing classes in 
Albanian, English and Macedonian.120 The University does not receive state funding 
since it is private. It was funded mainly by the international community and by private 
donations.  
In order to encourage greater representation for minorities within higher 
education, the government installed a form of positive discrimination to ease their 
admission requirements. This has helped provide greater Albanian participation in higher 
learning. Albanian representation increased from 4.9% in 2001 to 14.9% in 2004. The 
Southeast European University also claimed 5,400 Albanian students graduated in the 
2004–2005 year.  
Overall, educational rights have improved for the Albanians, but other minorities 
may be left out. According to the NGO National Roma center, only one in ten Roma 
children have finished primary school because they do not speak Macedonian.121 Since 
most schools teach in Macedonian, and some in Albanian, the Roma are completely left 
out of the education system. The government has started legislation for the assimilation 
of Romas in Macedonian mainstream. They are participating in the 2005–2015 
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Constitutional Amendments, Article 2, 3, and 4, 
http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf, accessed January 15, 2008.  
120 Kristina Balalovska, The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series, Macedonia 2006: Towards 
Stability? 42, http://www.ethnobarometer.org/pdf/wp11.pdfPg,  accessed June 15, 2008.  
121 Ibid.  
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International Decade of Roma program with other foreign governments in hopes of a 
framework to resolve Roma social issues.  
Other than providing educational rights for its minorities, the ROM has other 
problems within its educational system. It is extremely centralized, lacks financing, 
teachers are not motivated, and the system has poor administrative capacity. Also, a great 
portion of the population remains uneducated. In an analysis of the population’s 
educational structure, of the total number of persons aged over fifteen, about half do not 
have any or only a low level of education (Table 14). 122     
 
Table 14.   Education in the ROM 
Population-school training Total % 
Total 1579500 100 




Primary education 549200 34.8 
Three-year secondary 168000 10.7 




University education 114900 7.3 
Source: National Strategy for the Development of Education in the Republic of Macedonia 2005-2015 
 
The government has worked towards education reform. Its National Strategy for 
the Development of Education aimed to provide equal education for all citizens, raise the 
competencies of its teachers, provide greater resources to its schools, and improve 
education towards EU standards.123 The government has declared an increase in the 
education budget from 3.39% of GDP to 5%. They established a law to participate in the 
EU integrated Lifelong program that unites all European countries under the same 
                                                 
122 Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Macedonia, National Strategy for the 
Development of Education in the Republic of Macedonia 2005-2015, 29, 
http://www.ulb.ac.be/unica/docs/prium/Strategy-1.pdf , accessed June 15, 2008.   
123 Ibid., 17  
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standards. The program called for more compulsory education to be provided, and the 
government has put it into law. As of the 2008/2009 school year, students are provided 
Vocational Education and Training, and primary education has been extended from eight 
years to nine years.124 The reforms again have been backed by the international 
community (see Appendix D).  
 
Overall, the government has made strides in improving the social well-being of its 
citizens, but what do citizens think about their country’s progress? The International 
Republic Institute (IRI) conducted an in-person interview of 1,108 Macedonian citizens 
in April 2008125. When asked if the ROM is heading the right direction, 37% responded 
yes as opposed to 18% in December of 2001.  The survey indicates that citizens feel 
positive about EU and NATO integration, where over 90% of citizens support the 
country’s pursuit of membership. However, 70% of those surveyed felt that life was 
better under the former Yugoslavia.  
D. PROSPECTIVE EU MEMBER STATES  
The European Union has made it a priority to promote development of peace, 
stability, prosperity and freedom in South Eastern Europe.126 The countries of Croatia, 
Serbia, Bosnia, Turkey and Albania have all hoped that membership in the EU is in their 
near future. Each country shares similar problems in comparison to the ROM, including 
corruption, poor economic performance, ethnic divisions or slow institutional reform. 
The information below provides a brief summary of the common problems facing Balkan 
nations other than the ROM.127 Additionally, a comparison between the nations reveals 
their economic and corruption indicators (Tables 15 to 18).  
                                                 
124 Commission of the European Communities, the ROM 2007 Progress Report,  56, 
http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/whatsnew/2007/20%20fyrmacedonia_progress_reports_en.pdf, 
accessed July 16, 2008.  
125 The International Republic Institute, Macedonia 2008, April 11-15, 2008   
http://macedonia.usaid.gov/Documents/IRI_Public_Opinion_Survey_Dec-07. ppt accessed May 16 , 2008 
126 Europa, Enlargement strategy 2006-2007: challenges and integration capacity, 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50025.htm, accessed August 15, 2008. 
127 European Commission Enlargement, Potential Candidate Countries, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidate-countries/, accessed June 20, 2008.   
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1. Albania: The country is still recovering from the 1997 near civil unrest. Its 
main problems consist of poor dialogue between the government and the 
opposition on reforms, slow reforms on corruption, lack of independence 
and transparency of its judicial system, and lagging in its preparation for 
its 2009 Parliamentary elections based on OSCE and Venice Commission 
recommendations. Between 1991 and 2004, the EU has donated over 1.3 
Billion Euros in state reforms. In June 2006, Albania signed a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. 
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina:  Struggling with reconciliation between the 
Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. Corruption throughout the country’s 
administration and police forces remains widespread. Since 1991, the EU 
has provided 2.5 billion Euros worth of assistance. In June of 2008, they 
signed the SAA with the EU but only after Bosnia and Herzegovina 
promised to sign legislation on police reform. With the signed agreement, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina joins a European Partnership that focuses on key 
areas of reforms needed for European membership. This includes full co-
operation with the International Criminal Tribunal, reform of police 
services, adoption and implementation of required public broadcasting 
service legislation and strengthening public administration. 
3. Croatia: The enlargement commission stated that Croatia may be admitted 
between 2010 and 2012. Croatia was awarded candidate status is 2005 
while negotiations began later that year. The country’s economy has 
recovered nicely and is ahead of all EU prospective states towards 
admittance. However, problems in the country remain. This includes 
reforms within the judiciary and public administration, corruption, 
minority rights, and the return of refugees. The commission has also stated 
that in order to make progress in the accession negotiations, Croatia need 
to focus efforts on adopting EU legislation and building the administrative 
structures and capacity necessary for its correct enforcement. 
 76
4. Montenegro: Formerly a State Union member with Serbia. In May of 
2006, created a referendum for its independence. The next month was 
officially declared sovereign by the European Union. Signed the SAA in 
Oct. of 2007. The EU has states Montenegro must strengthen its rule of 
law, fight organized crime and corruption to continue its hopes towards 
EU integration.   
5. Serbia: Signed the SAA in May of 2008. Government is currently making 
two major transitions, first is a recent shake up of its parliament where a 
new collation was created, second was the difficulty of accepting Kosovo 
as an independent neighbor. Serbia faces the challenges of the SAA 
implementation. The EU has stated that this requires that Serbia cooperate 
fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
Other challenges include comprehensive institutional, political and 
economic reforms in line with priorities of the European Partnership. 
6. Turkey: Has been an EU candidate country since 1999. Political and 
human rights reforms has been a road block towards EU admittance. 
During accession negotiations, the EU has stated that Turkey must 
completely fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. Although reforms has 
progressed, the commission has states improvements are needed in the 
rights on non-Muslim religious communities, women’s rights, trade union 
rights and minimizing civilian control of the military. Another criterion for 
admittance has been good relations with its neighbors. Greece and Turkey 
relations have improved but a resolution over Cyprus would further help 
Turkey’s hopes of EU membership 
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Table 15.    Failed State Index  
Source: 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=292&Itemid=452, 
Failed State Index combines social, political and economic indicators. The higher the score, the worst off 
the country is. In the 2008 index, Somalia ranked 114.2 as the highest, while Norway ranked 16.8 as the 
lowest. 
  
Table 16.   Economic Indicators 2007 




Table 17.   Foreign Direct Investment Inflow 2007 
    Source: http://www.wiiw.ac.at 
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CPI Score
       Source: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007, CPI based on expert 
assessment and opinion surveys. In 2008, Denmark had a CPI of 9.3 being the highest; Somalia scored 1.0 
being the lowest. 
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As of August 2008, Croatia, the ROM and Turkey are official EU candidate 
countries. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia are prospective 
candidate countries who have all signed Stabilization and Association Agreements with 
the EU. If these nations conduct reforms based on the Copenhagen criteria, EU 
membership should be on the horizon.    
As EU members, nations unite under a single market. This allows the economic 
integration of member states by minimizing bureaucratic procedures and taxes on goods 
crossing the borders. It also allows freedom of movement for workers, unites members 
under a single currency and promotes competition under EU standards.   
 One major concern is the enlargement capacity of the European Union. If 
economically weak countries such as the ROM join the EU, stronger member states may 
have to carry the extra burden of supporting them. EU membership is seen as the major 
catalyst of reform in the Balkans. If the EU delays membership due to capacity 
limitations, Balkans states may not be so motivated towards progression, such as is the 
case in the ROM. In a conference on EU integration in June 2005, ROM Deputy Prime 
Minister Radmila Sekerinska stated, “Possible delay or stoppage of the enlargement will 
lead to delays in and complication of reforms, discouragement of home and foreign 
investors, and re-strengthening of populist in the region.”  
 EC President Jose Manuel Barroso told reporters that the EU would not slow 
down its enlargement process and no EU member has requested it do so.128 Growing 
fears about EU unity remain following the 2005 vote when an EU constitution failed to 
pass; France and the Netherlands voted “NO.”       
                                                 
128 Western Balkans, Macedonia concerned about possible enlargement slowdown, 
http://www.western-balkans.info/htmls/save_pdf2.php?id=741, accessed June 4, 2008.  
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Chapter II, the four desired end states for the Republic of Macedonia were 
stated, which consolidated information on what was seen as important for strengthening 
of the state and preventing conflicts. Chapter IV analyzed the ROM’s efforts to reform 
itself. This thesis concludes by examining whether the ROM has met the criteria outlined 
within the four desired end states, followed by recommendations for what is needed for 
further progress. Closing thoughts are provided, summarizing what has been 
accomplished in the ROM and what the future holds it.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Stable Democracy 
The ROM hopes to build legitimate institutions at the state, regional, and local 
level. Ministries and the civil service sector must ultimately be reliable, efficient, 
maintain integrity, and provide mechanisms to provide oversight into corruptions within 
the state’s political and civil body. 
The ROM’s institutional capacity has been greatly strengthened over the past 
decade. With the financial and technical support provided by the international 
community, the ministries and civil sector were modernized substantially. However, the 
ROM is still years away from becoming reliable and efficient. Political and ethnic 
favoritism is still common, while corruption remains a major impediment. The 2007 
Transparency International Corruption Index did show great improvement for the ROM 
in 2007, but the government must continue towards reform. Non-partisan corruption 
committees need to be organized to oversee the ministries and report directly to the EU. 
The EU must continue to provide liaison support for guidance and oversight. This support 
must continue even after the ROM becomes an EU member. The ROM must not only 
reform its institutions as an incentive towards EU membership, it must also retain 
concrete goals, with or without the EU, to build public confidence.  
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a. Sharing Power 
Has the ROM succeeded in implementing power sharing in a multi ethnic 
state? This concept includes equal representation of minorities within the state and local 
level, and decentralization to allow greater autonomy of ethnic groups. 
Despite the initial problems with decentralization, the government has 
made great progress towards its implementation. Legislative and other powers are being 
transferred to local governments. Greater fiscal responsibility has been provided to the 
municipalities. Projects spearheaded by EAR, USAID, and the UNDP have given 
confidence to local authorities. The government though must be wary that sensitivities 
towards proving ethnic Albanians greater autonomy could spoil the decentralization 
process. Decentralization needs to be an all-hands process that includes all citizens. 
Information campaigns needs to include public seminars, town hall meetings, and central 
to local government communication mechanisms. 
The government has committed itself to providing equal representation. 
An increase in Albanians in the workforce is visible in all sectors. The government must 
caution that increased employment for minorities has a negative effect on ethnic 
Macedonians, which could re-ignite ethnic tensions. Fulfilling minority quotas is a goal 
that should be undertaken in unison with programs to increase jobs for all citizens. This 
means attracting foreign companies — which opens new job opportunities — and 
promoting small businesses. Efforts must be made to formalize the grey market to shed 
new light on actual labor participation rates.         
2. Secure Environment and Rule of Law 
Can the ROM security forces protect international borders, key infrastructure, and 
airspace? 
The missions, led by the OSCE and EAR, have greatly improved the technical, 
logistical and readiness capacity of the civilian police force’s ability to guard the borders. 
Unfortunately, smuggling remains such a lucrative business it has only slightly curbed 
the high number of illegal activities. Relations with neighboring states can be used as a 
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force multiplier towards border security. Joint patrols and information sharing allows 
border security forces to be more proactive in their efforts.  
It is imperative that the armed forces of the ROM join NATO. This guarantees 
European military support in case an internal or regional conflict occurs. The government 
must continue to work with Greece on a resolution of the country’s name. After 17 years 
of debate, both countries need to look to the future, not the past.       
a. Police Forces 
Can the ROM maintain police forces that are transparent, accountable, and 
protective of human rights? Do these forces build civilian confidence?  Do they represent 
the ethnic makeup of the land?  
The increased number of ethnic Albanian civilian police has been 
impressive. Macedonian and Albanian forces have been integrated and are conducting 
joint patrols of neighborhoods, but a number of issues remain to be addressed. Human 
rights violations continue, especially towards smaller minorities. Citizens still have a low 
level of trust towards the civilian police force. Reform must continue, building 
community relations with the local police force. Town meetings with local police chiefs 
will allow citizens to voice complaints directly, while building a social network towards 
their security. Reports of human rights abuses need to result in EU-imposed on the 
government. A police code of ethics needs to be enforced, while the Ministry of Interior 
needs to be more critical of local police departments in enforcing policy.       
b. Judiciary 
Has the ROM built a legitimate and accountable judicial system that 
supports the state’s constitution, laws, and properties? Is it open to all ethnic groups in its 
application, treating all as equals? Are judges selected based on merit and not political 
favoritism? 
The ROM continues to lag in the area of judicial reform. Efforts toward 
reform only began through EU threats of delaying EU accession negotiations. The 
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government must utilize the same political will it did during the decentralization process 
to enforce change by weeding out corruption, improving case handling, and nominating 
judges based on a merit system. EU must provide heavy oversight to ensure reforms are 
in line with EU standards. NGOs must continue to report the unfair trials to the 
international community, which, in turn, will put pressure on the government for reform.      
3. Sustainable Economy 
Is the ROM building effective and reliable financial and economic institutions, 
promoting private business and entrepreneurship, and attracting foreign investment by 
accommodating international business? 
The ROM economic policy reforms have been impressive. The country is 
showing improvements in all sectors of its economy. Prime Minister Gruevski has been 
the force improving the ROM’s economy; compared with other Balkan nations, however, 
it still lags in areas such as growth and foreign investment. The ROM has been relatively 
stable since the 2001 conflict. Peace and stability should attract more foreign investment. 
EU memberships must remain the top priority of the government. Membership would 
open new markets for the ROM to improve growth, decrease inflation and combat 
unemployment. Cracking down on corruption and improving rule of law is essential for 
improving the economy. The ROM must invest wisely the funds received by the EU 
towards infrastructure, business development and tourism.     
a. Infrastructure 
Will the ROM be successful in its goal to reconstruct and invest in 
infrastructure such as transportation and communication? 
By modernizing the country’s major transport infrastructure, the 
movement of goods would improve, promoting external trade and also ensuring that 
towns are not isolated from receiving goods and services. The government must continue 
to invest in modernizing the nation’s infrastructure and communication network so it can 
compete with other EU nations.    
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b. The Workforce 
Has the ROM created policies that fight unemployment and has it trained a 
viable workforce? 
Unemployment remains the greatest problem facing the ROM. It could 
have a destabilizing effect on the nation. Economic reform must focus on attracting 
business that requires skilled workers while encouraging small business openings, which 
should lure workers away from the grey market. Unemployment of young adults must be 
addressed. If EU membership is achieved, it should open a new market for workers 
within the ROM and for citizens seeking work abroad.  
4.  Social Well-Being   
Does the ROM recognize and promote group political, cultural, and educational 
rights, allowing minority groups the opportunity to express their identity in a method 
accepted by the state?  
The Ohrid Framework Agreement has been fully implemented. The ethnic 
Albanian minority have received the desired language and educational rights. The 
Albanian political elite now must show good faith and prove it is committed to the 
progress of the ROM. Fears still exist that Albanians will only ask for more individual 
rights, which they will use towards secession. It is essential that Albanian and 
Macedonian leaders collaborate on decisions and demonstrate a united front to build 
public trust.     
a. Equal Education 
Does the ROM provide equal education to all ethnic groups, including 
opportunities for advanced education to encourage assimilation into the workforce.   
The positive discrimination policy towards university admittance has 
greatly increased Albanian participation in higher learning. The Albanian University in 
Tetovo is now state funded. The government must now focus on developing an 
educational system that promotes multi-ethnic classrooms, high educational standards, 
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and includes the smaller minorities, such as the Roma. EU membership allows incentives 
for students to pursue university education, where they now have the ability to work in 
other EU member states.     
B. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
 The 2001 ethnic conflict between the Macedonian security forces and the 
Albanian rebels exposed many problems within the Republic of Macedonia:  
• Years of ethnic Albanian marginalization would motivate opportunistic rebel 
groups to mobilize and challenge the state’s authority.  
• Deep levels of corruption paralyzed the country’s institutions and public 
confidence.  
• The lucrative business of border smuggling contributed to the proliferation of 
weapons, narcotics, and goods throughout Southeast Europe.  
• The country’s poor rule of law contributed to a lousy judicial system and the poor 
performance of the civilian police.  
 
 The signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement proved one thing: The 
government did not want to slide into the same violence that disrupted Croatia, Bosnia 
and Kosovo. Despite the international pressure to end violence, both the Macedonian and 
Albanian political elites forged the agreement and mustered the strength to implement it. 
While the ROM benefitted from foreign aid and international support, it was the 
government’s responsibility to pass legislation and execute reform.  
 The role of the European Union in developing the ROM cannot be overlooked. 
The Stabilization and Association Process has proved to be an effective system in 
developing the countries of Southeast Europe. The EU has realized that it is more cost- 
effective to prevent war, by strengthening institutions and developing economies, than it 
is to rebuild nations after war. EU membership provides the poor countries of the Balkans 
the hope of integrating into mainstream Europe rather than continuing isolation.  
 As noted in Chapter II, if a state fails to provide a stable democracy, rule of law, 
economic prosperity and social well-being, it could slip into conflict. This is what 
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happened in the case of the ROM. The insecurity of the new Macedonian nation led to 
the poor treatment of its minorities. The ROM feared it would be annexed by its 
neighboring states, which led to a strong nationalistic approach of governing itself. Ethnic 
Albanian nationalism was seen as a direct threat for secession and loss of land, which was 
understandable when its neighboring countries questioned the Macedonian existence. 
This led to restriction on cultural and educational rights for the ethnic Albanians and 
other minorities.    
The years since the 2001 conflict have been a lesson in democracy for 
Macedonians, who have learned that there is no substitute for a strong democracy. The 
ROM must now question the future:  Will the country remain peaceful, and is the future 
bright? Will the OHA stand the test of time, and will the country become an EU member? 
As long as the ROM continues the progress it has made in the past seven years, the 
answer is yes. Since the conflict, there has been no major outbreak of violence. The 
country has dealt with the death of a president, the uncertainty in the status of Kosovo, a 
national referendum on decentralization that threatened the implementation of the OHA, 
the NATO membership veto by Greece, and opposition political party walkouts in 
parliament. Despite these barriers, along with the ethnic and ideological divisions 
between the governments, the ROM continues to stumble its way towards the European 
Union.  
This leaves the author to believe that the citizens of the ROM truly want peace 
and prosperity. They see the EU as their best chance to forget the past and assimilate into 
Europe. They want a state that can provide them opportunities for education and 
professional employment. Macedonians do not want to be distracted by ethnic divisions. 
They want a government that combats high unemployment.  
The ROM is doing its part in reforming the state; the EU must also continue its 
commitment to the country. Delays in allowing Southeast Europe nations into the EU, 
after benchmarks have been reached, would frustrate the morale of these nations. If, in 
the next ten years, Balkan nations are proud members of the EU, these nations can finally 


























Source:  Projects for 2000-2005: http://www.ear.eu.int/sectors/main/sec-public_administration_mac.htm,  
2006: http://www.ear.eu.int/macedonia/main/mac-annual_programme_2006.htm. \ 
 
Total cost: 25.9 million Euros 
Project: Public and Local Administration Reform: Developing the administrations capacity to 
manage internal financial control management of EU assistance.  
Description: Support the Ministry of Local Self Governance and local authorities in the overall 
planning and coordination of the decentralization process. Support the local authorities in urban 
planning through the delivery of urban planning training and IT equipment. Support the Ministry of 
Finance and municipalities in developing a fiscal framework for decentralization.                    
Results: The training of civil servants from non-majority communities in public administration  
(Representation of minorities rose from 10% in 2002, to 16% in 2005). Established a government 
bureau for the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Provided policy advice, training, 
equipment and constructed small scale infrastructure projects in supporting the transfer of 
competencies from the central to local government. Helped the Ministry of Finance develop and 
introduce sound fiscal and budgetary practices. Supported Central Internal Audit Department within 
the Ministry of Finance to create a new law on Internal Audit. Assisted the Ministry of Local Self 
Government in implementation and coordination of the decentralization process.        
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B. UNDP ACTIVITIES ON DECENTRALIZATION 2005–2009 
 
Project Title: Capacity Building at Local and National Level for MDG Based Planning 
 
Description: Focused on capacity development of local stakeholders in development (planning, 
implementation, monitoring). Help facilitate the integration of local interest and priorities into national 
level planning   
 
Donor and Budget: Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), $203,000 USD 
 
Location and period of project: Demir Kapija, Brvenica, Rosoman, Makedonski Brod, April 2007-April 
2009 
Interim Results: Project structure and coordination established. Local leadership Groups in four 
municipalities established. First training “Citizens Participation local development processes” for Local 
Leadership Groups implemented in all four municipalities. Training manuals for local development 
planning revised and published  
Project Title: Inter-Municipal partnerships for improved public service quality-I 
 
Description: Improvement of the quality of public services provision at the local level through the 
enhancement of the inter-municipal cooperation in the context of ongoing decentralization reform 
 
Donor and Budget: Norway, 400,000 Euros 
 
Location and Period of Project: Vasilevo, Bosilivo and Novo Selo, August 2008-September 2008 
Interim Results: Assessments and recommendation for quality improvement of public services in area of 
urban planning, tax administration and inspection supervision. Wireless network established between the 
three municipalities. IT equipment provided and local area infrastructure established. A basic guide for 
Human Resource Management developed to support civil servants responsible for implementation of HR 
function. 
Project Title: Friendly Libraries for All Citizens 
 
Description: Transfer of local libraries in the ownership of local government units, in terms of their 
rehabilitation and functional reorganization. Objective is to transfer libraries into multi functional cultural 
and information centers with improved citizens access to information 
 
Donor and Budget: Norway, 415,000 Euros 
 
Location and Period of Project: Kavadarci, Radovis, Strumica, Kocani, Vinica, and Cair (Skopje), June 
2005-June 2007  
 
Interim Results as of mid 2007: Process of infrastructural reconstruction of the libraries in Strumica, 
Kavadarci, and Radovis was completed in 2006. A web portal for the libraries was activated and hosted. 
ICT center was established in Vinica. Training to employees towards Advanced levels in Microsoft 
Offices Applications, Relationships between library/librarian and the client, partnerships between the 
library and the community.  
Source: http://www.undp.org.mk/default.asp?where=projects&item=activeprojects 
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C. DECENTRALIZATION AID EFFORTS BY USAID, IREX, AND SADC 
 
Agency: USAID  
 
Project Title: USAID Decentralization Project 
 
Description: Continuation of the USAID Government Reform Project, which provides technical assistance 
in the area of decentralization, which includes IT, hardware and software support, small scale community 
improvements and grant support to municipalities.    
 
Budget and Period: 11.5 million USD, expired July 2007 
 
Results: Supported the establishment of financial management and tax administration capacities. Ensured 
regular utilization of citizen participation mechanisms in public-making through practicable IT solutions. 
Assisted in the implementation of one stop permitting systems that resulted in improved zoning, city 
planning and permitting capacity of the municipalities. 
Agency: IREX Europe 
 
Project Title: Supporting decentralization through strengthening local broadcasters 
 
Description: Objective is to increase citizen’s access to accurate information on the decentralization 
process thus encouraging active participation in decision- making 
 
Budget and Period: Unknown  
 
Results: Provided seven in house workshops, bringing in experts on decentralization, to ensure local 
journalists and media fully understand the process. Training which focused on providing quality news 
programs incorporating issue based reporting on decentralization.    
Agency: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
 
Project Title: ZELS Autonomy and Service Project 
 
Description: Strengthen the management capacity of the association of Local Self Government Units 
(ZELS). Purpose of ZELS is to strengthen inter-municipal cooperation and assisting inter-ethnic 
committees. In is to serve as once voice of all municipalities. The program hopes to provide translation 
equipment to all municipalities.   
 
Budget and Project duration: 2.60 million CHF, September 2007 thru end of 2010.  
 
Results: In progress 
Source:                                                                                                                                                                      
USAID:http://macedonia.usaid.gov/English/DG/Decentralization_eng.html,                                                         
IRXE:http://www.europe.irex.org/programs/macedonia/localbroadcasters.asp,                                                     
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation: 
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APPENDIX B 
A. EAR ACTIVITIES IN SECURITY REFORM 2001-2006 
2001  
Project:                                                                                                                            Budget: 
Integrated border management                                                                                5 Million Euros  
Border demarcation with FRY and FRY/Kosovo                                                   1 Million Euros 
Integrated communications network for BCPs                                                       1.5 Million Euros 
Strengthening of control at 'Green Border'                                                             2 Million Euros 
Integrated border management strategy                                                                 .5 Million Euros 
Customs administration                                                                                          4 Million Euros  
2002 
Project:                                                                                                                           Budget: 
Integrated border management                                                                               2.2 Million Euros 
Immigration & asylum                                                                                           2.0 Million Euros 
Fight against crime                                                                                                 1.0 Million Euros  
2003 
Project:                                                                                                                            Budget: 
Integrated border management                                                                               6 Million Euros  
Immigration & asylum                                                                                           1 Million Euros 
Fight against crime                                                                                                 3 Million Euros 
2004 
Project:                                                                                                                           Budget: 
Integrated border management                                                                                10 Million Euros 
 Fight against crime                                                                                                  4 Million Euros  
2005 
Project:                                                                                                                            Budget: 
Combating money laundering (Phase II)                                                                   1.5 Million Euros 
Strengthening capacity to combat organized crime & terrorism                              .5 Million Euros 
2006                
Project:                                                                                                                             Budget: 
Police and the Fight against Organized Crime                                                           2 Million Euros 
Integrated Border Management                                                                                 3.5 Million Euros 
 
Results: 
Successful transition of control of green borders from the Army to the civilian police. 115 vehicles 
provided to new border police services. Construction of facility to house the National Border management 
Co-ordination Center. Border search and detection equipment supplied. Developed national strategies to 
combat money laundering and drug related crimes. The strengthening of the police academy through 






B. OSCE SPILLOVER MONITOR MISSION TO SKOPJE 
Budget: N/A 
Description: Provide confidence building, monitoring, police advising and the training of a multi-ethnic 
force. Key mission was for creation a Police Development Unit to bring minority representation within 
standards set fourth by the OFA. 
 
Timeframe: 1992 to present  
 
Results: In 2001, was issued a mandate to train 500 police officers from the non majority community by 
July 2002 which was accomplished. In 2004, 1,176 police officers were trained increasing Albanian 
representation from 4.5% to 17% in three years. In 2005, trained 3000 officers on modern management 
development, surveillance techniques, fighting human trafficking, election security, and code of police 
ethnics.  Assisted the Ministry of Interior with guidance and expertise towards its New Law on Police, 
which was adopted in October of 2006.      
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APPENDIX C 
A. EAR ACTIVITIES TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 2001-2006 
Source: http://www.ear.eu.int/macedonia/macedonia.htm 
2001 
Project:                                                                                                        Budget: 
Small Infrastructure for local governments                                                  2.5 Million Euros 
Transport                                                                                                       11 Million Euros 
Support to economic reforms                                                                        3 Million Euros 
Agriculture                                                                                                    3.25 Million Euros 
2002 
Project:                                                                                                                      Budget: 
Private & financial sector development                                                                     2 Million Euros 
Trade                                                                                                                          4 Million Euros 
Local infrastructure development                                                                              14 Million Euros 
Economic and social development                                                                             3 Million Euros 
 
2003 
Project:                                                                                                                      Budget: 
Private & financial sector development                                                                     3 Million Euros 
Trade                                                                                                                          4 Million Euros 
Local infrastructure development                                                                              9 Million Euros 
Economic and social development                                                                            3 Million Euros 
2004 
Project:                                                                                                                       Budget: 
Private & financial sector development                                                                      4.5 Million Euros 
Trade                                                                                                                           4 Million Euros 
Local infrastructure development                                                                               8.5 Million Euros 
Economic and social development                                                                             3 Million Euros 
2005 
Project:                                                                                                                        Budget: 
Improvement of the investment climate in FYR Macedonia                                       1.2 Million Euros 
Small & medium-size enterprise development                                                            2.4 Million Euros 
Co-operation with IFIs – Transport networks management                                         1 Million Euros 
2006 
Project:                                                                                                                        Budget: 
Investment Climate                                                                                                      4.5 Million Euros 
Trade                                                                                                                            2..2 Million Euros 
Infrastructure                                                                                                                1.6 Million Euros 
Employment                                                                                                                 3.3 Million Euros 
Expected Results: 
Improved business environment through better implementation of legislative framework and the enhancement of 
credibility of regulatory institutions. Starting the integration of the informal economy. Increased competiveness in 
the private sector. Increased number of start-up businesses. Higher level of Foreign Direct Investment. Institutions 
for controlling food and feed quality are in place, and legislation is improved. Support the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication and Fund for National and Regional Roads with the development of appropriate maintenance plans.  
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B. WORLD BANK LOAN PROJECT FOR THE ROM 


















Total Loan: 85 million USDs 
Project:  
Programmatic Policy Development Policy Loan 1 (PDPL 1) Oct. 27, 2005 thru Jun 30, 2006   
Programmatic Policy Development Policy Loan 2 (PDPL 2) Mar. 27, 2007 thru Dec 31, 2007   
Programmatic Policy Development Policy Loan 3 (PDPL 3) May 13, 2008 thru Dec 31, 2008 
Description:  
A series of loans designed to support the government’s economic reform program over a three to four 
year program. It aims to promote economic growth and job creation through (1) reforms to improve 
the investment climate, (2) reforms to strengthen the governance and efficiency of the public sector, 
and (3) through strengthening industry and trade.  
Results:  
Ongoing  
Total Loan 75.8 million USDs 
Project:  
Three year Stand-By Arrangement loan Aug. 31, 2005 thru Aug 31, 2008   
Description:  
Structural reforms to improve business climate, competiveness, and sound macroeconomic policies to 
maintain financial stability. Program should bring down non- wage labor costs and draw employment 
out of the grey market, thus ensuring that labor enjoys legal protections while contributing to 





D. USAID ACTIVITIES TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1993-
2007 
 
USAID assistance with the new Law on Electronic Communications (passed in 2005) created a level 
playing field for the sector.  
USAID provided technical assistance in the development of the Law on Public Procurement (passed in 
2007) that increased transparency of the government’s tendering process. 
Over $220 million in securities has been sold since 2003 through Macedonia's first Treasury Securities 
Market, designed with USAID support.  
USAID advised the Ministry of Finance on the issuance of Macedonia's first-ever publicly 
traded government bond, which securitized 500 million Euro in frozen deposits and created a liquid 
security that substantially increased turnover on the Macedonia Stock Exchange. 
USAID provided training on debt and portfolio management to the Ministry of Finance, which now 
efficiently manages the total public debt of $2.7 billion while spreading the maturities at the domestic 
government bonds market and introducing Eurobonds.  
USAID helped the Macedonia Stock Exchange design a new website to deliver publicly available financial 
information on companies to investors and other audiences.    
The new web portal for the Employment Service Agency (ESA) has been created where resumes and job 
announcements are posted. More than 500 resumes have been posted on the web portal. 
20,000 brochures for the employers and active job seekers were published and distributed to ESA local 
offices as part of the organization’s re-branding.  
11 USAID-assisted processed food companies who attended the 2007 Anuga trade fair in Germany sold 
more than $1 million worth of products to export markets at the fair. 
Information technology (IT) firms directly assisted by USAID more than doubled their exports of software 
and services from 2002 to 2006.  
Nearly 150 new collections for international home accessories, fashion and gift markets, as well as local 
consumer and tourist markets have been designed and marketed through the USAID Aid to Artisans 
project. 
Local and export sales for craft enterprises facilitated by USAID through Aid to Artisans increased by 520 
percent between 2003 and 2004.1 
The USAID Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Fund, now transformed into a local non-bank financial 
institution Crimson Development Foundation, issued 136 loans worth $9.3 million from 2004 to 2007. 
These loans created 825 new jobs and financed over $20 million in new exports. 
Foreign tourism to Macedonia almost doubled from 2002 to 2006 (form 112,300 to 197,000 visitors) as a 
result of USAID support to adventure tourism. 
43,000 visitors learned about Macedonia over the national tourism portal Exploring Macedonia created 
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APPENDIX D 




(1) Primary Education Project (PEP), Oct. 1, 2006 thru Sep. 30, 2011                                                   
(2) Secondary Education Activity (SEA) Sep. 5, 2003 thru Sep. 4, 2008   
Description:  
(1) Improve the overall quality of primary education by increasing the level of teaching and learning, 
renovating schools, and increasing access to computer and internet technologies. (2) Improve the 
overall quality of education in all vocational schools by proving teacher development, career 
development, and strengthening school management and governance.     
Results:  
Over 7000 students are currently enrolled at South Eastern European University (SEEU), a multi-
ethnic, multi-lingual institution founded with USAID support. Five faculties are operating with over 
75 percent Albanian and 20 percent non-Albanian enrolled students.  
 
Installed 2,000 computers in the nation’s 100 secondary schools and nearly 4,000 computers in 360 
primary schools.  
 
All 19 general secondary schools have been equipped with media-labs and all 1,100 teachers trained 
in interactive-teaching methodologies. 
 
Nearly 9,000 primary and secondary teachers have been trained in basic IT skills and an integration of 
IT into the classroom. 
 
From 2005 to 2007, USAID provided free high-speed internet to 460 schools nationwide. 
 
2,225 Roma students - 417 in pre-school, 1,450 in primary school, 264 in secondary school and 94 in 
university - have been supported to stay in school and improve their academic achievement. 
 
Career centers have been established in 71 vocational secondary schools, with a total enrollment of 
over 20,000 students.   
 
In 2007, eight primary schools were renovated with $300,000 from USAID and additional funding of 
at least 15 percent from their municipalities.   
 
In 2006, USAID helped Macedonia to become the first wireless country of its size in the world. 
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Total Loan:  
19.5 million USDs 
 
Project:  
Education Modernization Project, Dec 16. 2003 thru Sep 30, 2009 
Description:  
Improve and provide uniform quality of education, support for access of minorities towards higher 
education and assist the decentralization of education towards local authorities.  
Results: Ongoing  
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